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Introduction
During the past 20 years, those working to prevent foodborne illnesses in the United States–whether in government,
industry, academia, or the consumer advocacy community–have made major progress in understanding food safety
as a farm-to-fork challenge that necessitates science-based efforts throughout the system. Numerous reports have
called for a more risk-informed and data-driven approach to U.S. food safety, and legislation currently being
considered in Congress includes provisions to strengthen the scientific basis of the nation’s food safety system.
A science- and risk-driven approach is built upon a foundation of data. Those working in food safety often face the
dual problems of both too much and too little information; they must cope with an explosion of information from
individuals and organizations, but the specific information they require may not be available or accessible–if it has
been collected at all. While positive efforts in the United States are attempting to address these challenges, serious
obstacles remain. Ultimately, improving the risk basis of the U.S. food safety system will require a more coordinated
and integrated approach to collecting, managing, analyzing, and communicating food safety information.
These challenges are not unique to the United States, and the efforts of other countries to institute programs, policies,
and practices to support a risk-informed system can inform similar efforts in this country. In particular, the bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or “mad cow disease,” epidemic and large Salmonella outbreaks in the 1990s
led to major changes in the food safety systems of Europe. The reforms of the past decade also have had significant
implications for the role of risk analysis in food safety decision-making and, subsequently, have affected the way
that data are collected and analyzed to support policy.
This report focuses on food safety activities in three countries: Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
The food safety efforts of these case-study countries are highly respected, and all three countries have undertaken
significant reform to improve the science and analytical basis of their food safety decisions. This report also draws
lessons from efforts at the European Union (EU) level.
The purpose of this report is not to directly compare the food safety systems of the United States and these three
European countries nor to suggest that the United States should seek to employ a European approach to food safety.
Rather, the goal is to learn from a decade of significant food safety reforms in Europe, with a focus on examples of
programs, policies, and activities that could improve food safety in the United States.
Motivation
Foodborne illnesses remain an important cause of morbidity and mortality in the United States, related both to
acute illnesses and to associated chronic sequelae. Furthermore, major contamination outbreaks in recent years,
associated with a spectrum of foods, have created anxiety among consumers.
Concerns about foodborne illnesses and efforts to improve U.S. food safety are nothing new. The past 30 years have
brought many calls for the modernization of the food safety system to better reflect changes in food production,
consumption patterns, and scientific understanding. U.S. food safety laws were written more than 100 years ago,
and the need for change has been iterated in more than a dozen major reports by expert bodies both inside and
outside of government, such as the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) (see, for example: GAO 1992, 2001, 2004, 2005; NAS 1985, 1987, 1998, 2003).
Executive Summary
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These reports share, for the most part, a similar vision for a modern food safety system that is oriented toward
public health and prevention, that embraces a farm-to-table approach, and that is based upon the best available
science and information. Many call for risk-based allocation of resources and the prioritization of opportunities to
reduce risk, as well as for improved coordination and integration of federal, state, and local efforts. They also
recommend a system that is more responsive to emerging issues and that focuses on stopping outbreaks quickly
and effectively.
Moreover, a modern food safety system may be defined as one that attempts to address policy questions, not only
through subjective opinion, but through explicit consideration of objective information. This idea was expressed in
the 2008 report from the Food Safety Research Consortium, Harnessing Knowledge to Ensure Food Safety:
Each of the many participants in today’s food safety system has a distinct role to play, but they all have
one thing in common: the effectiveness of what they do depends on information. Up and down the line,
actors in the system depend on information about potential hazards and how to minimize them, and, in
the end, actors are only as good as the information on which they base their actions. This broader
understanding of food safety permits us—indeed, requires us—to think of the food safety system as an
information system (Taylor and Batz 2008).
The Information Infrastructure
As part of the team that published Harnessing Knowledge to Ensure Food Safety, we explored how to improve what
we termed the nation’s “food safety information infrastructure” or FSII, which is made up of “the many public and
private institutions, programs, and processes through which information is collected, made accessible, and actively
shared to ensure food safety in the United States” (Taylor and Batz, p.xi). As part of that project, we learned about
how food safety information is currently collected, managed, and used. To briefly summarize our findings:
• The U.S. food safety information infrastructure is vastly complex and largely decentralized.
! Few mechanisms for planning and coordinating data collection exist. Food safety epidemiology is decentral-
ized and largely reactive to outbreaks. It is not planned in coordination with those in regulatory agencies or
with those in the food industry who devise preventive strategies.
• Numerous institutional obstacles hinder information-sharing.
! Government agencies lack the mandate and resources to collaborate on collecting or sharing information,
and legal constraints, such as privacy laws, make sharing data more difficult. Further, those who collect data
often have a sense of ownership and can be reluctant to share their findings.
• Technical obstacles hinder data aggregation and integration.
! The lack of standardized approaches to data collection, including sampling protocols and analytical
methods, makes it difficult or impossible to compare data from diverse sources.
! Compilation of data is complicated or made impossible by the incompatibility of data formats and informa-
tion systems.
Methodology and Approach
In our prior research into the U.S. food safety information infrastructure, we became aware of efforts in other
countries to improve the information base of their food safety systems. We sought to clarify what their activities might
be, and we quickly identified efforts, ranging from individual research projects to major institutional overhauls, in
countries as nearby as Canada and as far away as New Zealand.
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With funding from the Produce Safety Project, an initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts at Georgetown University
in Washington, D.C., we decided to concentrate on a limited number of case-study countries for which we would
review the scientific literature and conduct telephone and in-person interviews.
We decided to focus on Europe because we could examine a few individual countries there as well as the broader
EU food safety framework. We chose the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands for our individual
countries for reasons including the recommendations of colleagues and the promising aspects of their information-
driven programs. For example, we were aware of a Danish program for attributing human cases of salmonellosis to
animal sources, of a large Netherlands project aimed at prioritizing interventions to reduce cases of Campylobacter,
and of a British project to analyze the relative risk of various hazards in the food chain. Furthermore, all three
countries had undergone major reforms to their food safety institutions in the past decade.
We identified three basic questions for our case studies:
1.How have reforms in the EU and the case-study countries affected the collection, management, analysis,
and communication of food safety information?
2.To what extent do the EU and the case-study countries employ coordinated and integrated approaches to
food safety information?
3.How are public health surveillance data and epidemiological research used within the food safety system,
particularly with respect to preventive activities?
To answer these questions, we first examined the relevant peer-reviewed literature and read government and
academic reports on the collection of food safety data, research, and policymaking in Europe. We then traveled to
Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom to interview experts and government officials from food safety,
public health, and scientific institutions, and, to the extent possible, to witness the systems for ourselves. We also
conducted phone interviews with experts in the United States and in other countries and had follow-up conversations
with our European colleagues. We have asked for comments on our findings and incorporated the feedback we’ve
received into our report.
Our goal was to discover what we could learn from the experiences of these European countries, and what actions,
if any, could be taken from their experiences and used to improve the information foundation of the U.S. food safety
system.
Comparing U.S. and EU Food Safety Systems
The U.S. and European approaches to food safety are far more alike than they are different. Rates of foodborne
illnesses are generally similar in both spheres, and no substantial data suggest that food consumed in the United
States is any safer or less safe than that consumed in Europe.
Yet direct comparisons between the U.S. and European food safety systems are problematic. The United States has
more than twice the area of the European Union, but only 60 percent of the EU’s population (300 million versus
500 million). Comparing the United States to individual EU countries is even more jarring: The United Kingdom
is the size of Michigan, yet its population equals that of California and Texas combined. The closest U.S. state to
Denmark in size and population is Tennessee, and the Netherlands is the size of Indiana but with about three times
as many people. The appendices provide detailed background on food safety systems in Europe and the case-study
countries.
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The uniqueness of the EU political and legal framework further complicates the situation. The European food safety
system can be described as “multilevel” (Ansell and Vogel 2006). It is made up of supranational bodies, such as the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), and of the national bodies of the 27 EU member states, as well as the
provincial and local agencies within those countries. Food safety policies are set at the EU level, but the programs
for achieving targets are designed, implemented, and enforced at the national level.
On its face, this multilevel governance mirrors the relationship between the federal government and state agencies
within the United States, but EU member states arguably maintain more sovereignty than U.S. states. Further, while
the U.S. states have important differences in institutional structures, legal frameworks, and policies, the differences
in governance among EU states are far more complex. These same reasons make it difficult to compare the United
States to individual European countries. Significant cultural, demographic, and sociopolitical differences also exist
between European countries and the United States.
Findings
As described in detail in Chapter 2, we found that some European reforms have directly affected the collection,
management, analysis, and communication of food safety information. In examining efforts within Denmark, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, we have identified policies and activities that have improved the information
foundation required for food safety policy that is science-based, risk-informed, and data-driven. These findings are
summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Summary of Findings
1
The consolidation and centralization of food safety authority has improved information
flows supportive of science- and risk-based policy.
2
Annual reports provide policymakers and stakeholders with unified analysis of pathogen
surveillance in humans, animals, food, and feed.
3
Integrated approaches to data collection, collation, and analysis include advanced food
attribution programs that combine human data with animal and food data.
4
The European Union and some EU countries employ coordinated surveillance programs
for pathogens in animals, food, and feed.
5
Independent scientific institutes facilitate integrated approaches to managing and
analyzing data.
6 Regulatory agencies prioritize and partially coordinate research programs.
7 Risk analysis is the defined process for policy decision-making.
8 Programs and policies employ transparency and public participation as key principles.
9
The European Union has extensive traceability requirements and has made major
investments in next-generation systems.
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Consolidation and centralization
Centralization of authority at the EU level through the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has led to increased
coordination of data programs and increased integration of data across countries, as well as to the harmonization
of surveillance and regulation. Major differences in national food safety systems across Europe remain, however.
Some member states, including Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have consolidated food safety
authority within a single regulatory and inspection agency. These consolidation reforms have reduced duplication
and fragmentation of effort, but the reality of the “single food agency” has been overstated; in all three case-study
countries, key responsibilities related to food safety remain spread across several agencies. Nevertheless, consolidation
reforms have helped to clarify the roles and responsibilities of these agencies and have led to increased coordination
and integration of food safety information.
Annual reports
The EU publishes an integrated annual report that presents data collected from all member countries on foodborne
disease, foodborne outbreaks, and pathogen surveillance in food and food animals. These reports are notable in
part because they aggregate across so many countries, but also because they combine two key types of data that are
rarely presented in the same place: data on human illnesses, which are collected through public health surveillance
systems; and data on the contamination of food and food animals, which are collected by regulatory agencies. Some
member countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, routinely publish their own annual
or biannual reports, which are even more extensive than the EU-wide reports. The United Kingdom also publishes
an annual report on all science and research conducted by its Food Standards Agency (FSA). These reports represent
a major step forward in the routine communication of scientific food safety information not only among governments,
but with the public, the food industry, and policymakers who use the information in planning and prioritization.
Integrated data systems and analysis
Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom employ integrated approaches to information management and
analysis, including multi-agency databases and food attribution models that explicitly combine and analyze data
from human illnesses with data from food and animals. These models focus on pathogen subtyping to link pathogen
strains from humans with those from animals. These integrated approaches to data and analysis facilitate integrated
annual reports.
Coordinated data collection
The European Union employs standardized EU-wide baseline surveys to estimate the prevalence and levels of
pathogenic contamination in arrays of foods and sets minimum requirements for routine pathogen surveillance for
selected pathogens and food animals. These coordinated studies are used to set targets and develop microbial
standards in food-animal production. Some member countries, such as Denmark, maintain more extensive routine
monitoring programs than required by the EU. These coordinated food-animal surveillance systems have been
critical to enabling integrated analysis.
Independent scientific institutes
In all three case-study countries, risk assessment is housed in independent governmental science bodies that are
separate from risk-management agencies. These bodies maintain the lead roles in data collection and analysis and
are responsible for both the surveillance of human illnesses and data on microbiological hazards in animals, food,
and feed. This arrangement creates a critical mass of information and expertise; improves the coordination, flow,
and integration of relevant data; and facilitates advanced analyses.
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1 “One-up, one-down” traceability is an approach in which food companies must maintain records to identify from whom they
obtained input products or ingredients and to whom they sold their food products.
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Coordinated research priorities
Although research and data collection are largely conducted by independent scientific and risk-assessment institutes
and agencies in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, much of the funding for these activities flows
through policy and risk-management agencies. Regulatory decision-makers, therefore, set broad priorities for
scientific programs across government agencies and ensure that research, data collection, analyses, and reporting
are responsive to policymakers’ needs.
Basis in risk analysis
The European Union and many member countries, including Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,
embrace risk analysis as a formal process to inform food safety policy and decision-making, including the delineation
of responsibilities for risk management, risk assessment, and risk communication. For microbial hazards, this has
largely resulted in more data-driven policy, as mandatory risk assessments have required scientific support and data
collection. Public health surveillance data are used by the EFSA and some member states in policymaking and
decision contexts, including priority setting, resource allocation, policy development, and program management.
Transparency and public participation
Transparency and public participation are key principles of European food safety systems, particularly of the EFSA
and of the United Kingdom’s FSA, and are a means of gaining and maintaining the public confidence. To increase
transparency and participation, agencies coordinate with stakeholders and advisory committees, hold open
management meetings, and publish extensively, including meeting minutes, evidence and analyses supporting
decisions, and planning and prioritization documents.
Traceability
Mandatory traceability is a foundational principle of EU food safety law; all food and feed must be traceable “one-
up, one-down,”1 by food and feed businesses, including importers. Unlike in the United States, primary producers
and restaurants are not excluded from these requirements, and mandatory animal-identification systems are in
place for livestock. The EU has invested €100 million in nine traceability research projects, including efforts aimed
at developing integrated traceability systems and harmonizing existing systems.
Recommendations
The Case for Major Institutional Reform
We found that reforms aimed at consolidating food safety authority were critical to building a strengthened role for
information-driven analysis and decision-making in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It would
be premature to recommend an overhaul of U.S. food safety institutions based on three brief case studies, but our
findings and prior research suggest that the creation of a Cabinet-level food safety agency in the United States would
be a major, and perhaps necessary, step toward a science- and risk-based food safety system. To be effective, such
a Cabinet-level agency would need to coordinate regulatory and inspection programs of the food safety offices of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and maintain funding lines
to agencies to ensure appropriate data inflows. It also would need to have broad authority to allocate resources,
prioritize preventative efforts, and coordinate data collection and research.
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Similarly, although the scientific research and analyses conducted within FDA and USDA’s Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) are of high quality, expertise is spread across two rather small divisions and remains
separated from the epidemiologists within the foodborne group of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). The fragmentation of data and analytical capacity among CDC, FDA, and FSIS makes it nearly impossible
to maintain integrated programs geared toward linking human and food-animal surveillance data. Our findings in
Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom show the strength of maintaining single institutions to oversee
scientific advice. Combined with a Cabinet-level food safety agency, such an institution in the United States could
greatly improve scientific coordination and integration. A new, independent Federal Institute for Food Safety Risk
Analysis, staffed mostly by scientists and analysts within FDA, USDA, and CDC food safety groups, would support
a risk-based food system through integrated research, data collection, and analysis.
Within the existing systems, and/or in conjunction with the creation of an independent Federal Institute for Food-
Safety Risk Analysis, we would make the following specific recommendations, as detailed in Chapter 3:
Produce unified annual reports of foodborne pathogen surveillance in humans, animals, food, and feed.
• Mandate (and fund) CDC, FDA, and USDA to collaborate on an annual report that presents, in a single,
consumer-friendly volume, aggregated data and analysis on surveillance of human foodborne illnesses,
including outbreaks, and on the surveillance of pathogens in animals, food, and feed. These reports should
include routinely updated national estimates of the incidence of disease caused by major foodborne pathogens.
Improve farm-to-fork microbial surveillance of domestic and imported food.
• Develop a unified national surveillance plan for food contamination, incorporating advanced subtyping of
isolates and with increased investment in routine monitoring, baseline studies, and food surveys.
Increase capacity for integrated food attribution analysis.
• Develop a unified strategy for estimating the relative contribution of various foods to the overall foodborne
disease burden (i.e., food attribution analysis) by:
! Creating and funding a common working group to integrate and analyze data from CDC, FDA, and USDA.
! Integrating pathogen subtyping data from food, animals and feed into PulseNet, a CDC-coordinated
network of federal, state and local laboratories. Also, adopt additional subtyping methods into PulseNet, and
explicitly link PulseNet to outbreak data.
• Develop a unified strategy to support setting broad priorities across and within food safety agencies.
• Provide funding pathways to ensure access to data and analyses.
Improve the coordination of food safety research.
• Develop a unified long-term strategic vision of food safety research needs and publish annual prioritized lists
of specific needs, with the integration of risk regulators into the setting of research priorities.
Improve transparency and public participation.
• Establish transparency policies that increase publication of data and analyses used to support decisions.
• Increase stakeholder engagement and public participation in analytical activities beyond major risk assess-
ments.
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Improve the effectiveness of trace-back and trace-forward data for outbreak response.
• Extend traceability requirements back to the farm and forward through food service.
• Develop standardized recordkeeping formats to facilitate harmonized data and create incentives for electronic
recordkeeping.
The Produce Safety Project at Georgetown University • www.producesafetyproject.org
2 http://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls/default.htm
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A Persistent and Vexing Problem
Foodborne illnesses remain an important cause of morbidity and mortality in the United States, related both to
acute illness and to associated chronic sequelae. Despite some advances, recent data suggest foodborne illnesses are
no longer in decline. In recent years, major food outbreaks have been associated with a spectrum of foods, including
meat and poultry, fresh produce, canned goods, processed foods, and refrigerated and frozen foods (see Table 2 for
a listing of some major outbreaks in the past three years). In 2010, additional outbreaks or recalls have been caused
by contaminated black and red pepper, cheese, beef, pecans, frozen chicken potpies, instant noodles, ready-to-eat
meats, and HVP, or hydrolyzed vegetable protein.2
Table 2: Major U.S. foodborne illness outbreaks, 2006-2009
Introduction
Year Pathogen Minimum Impact
Aug.-Sept.
2006
E. coli O157:H7 in bagged spinach
199 ill in 26 states, three deaths;
$200 million in damages
Sept. 2006 Salmonella Typhimurium in tomatoes 190 ill, 24 hospitalized
2006 Salmonella Newport in tomatoes 115 ill, eight hospitalized
Nov.-Dec.
2006
E. coli O157:H7 in iceberg lettuce at Taco
Bell, originally thought to be associated
with green onions
71 ill
Feb. 2007 Salmonella in Peter Pan peanut butter
425 ill in 25 states; recall cost, $50-
$60 million
June 2007 Salmonella in Veggie Booty snack 65 ill in 20 states
2007





I4,[5],12:i:- in frozen potpies
401 ill (reported), 65 hospitalized
2007
Clostridium botulinum in canned chili
sauce
eight ill
Apr. 2008 Salmonella in cantaloupes from Honduras 60 ill in 16 states
2008
Salmonella Saintpaul in imported jalapeno
and serrano peppers (and possibly
tomatoes)
1,442 ill in 43 states, 286
hospitalizations, two deaths
(possible). Florida tomato producers
lost about $100 million
The Produce Safety Project at Georgetown University • www.producesafetyproject.org
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The problem goes beyond outbreaks, however. Last year, the CDC reported that “progress toward the national
health objectives has plateaued, suggesting that fundamental problems with bacterial and parasitic contamination
are not being resolved” (CDC 2009a). More recently, the CDC reported that “FoodNet surveillance data for 2009
show reductions in the incidence of STEC O157 and Shigella infections, but little or no recent progress for other
pathogens” (CDC 2010).
As a consequence, consumer confidence has eroded. A 2008 poll found that 80 percent of Americans were concerned
or very concerned about food safety (Consumer Reports 2008), and a poll conducted in the wake of the peanut
butter outbreak found that fewer than one in four consumers believed that the U.S. food supply was safer than it
was a year earlier (FIC 2009).
Changing Times
Concerns about foodborne illnesses and efforts to improve the safety of the food supply are nothing new. When
Upton Sinclair penned The Jungle more than 100 years ago, the resulting public outcry spurred the passage of the
Pure Food and Drugs Act and the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906.3 These laws, since amended, are the
foundation of today’s food safety system, which is comprised of more than 200 federal laws and a dozen federal
agencies (NAS 1998).
The production, delivery, and consumption of food changed dramatically during the 20th century, as technological
strides improved agricultural production and processing, as Americans increasingly ate meals away from home, as
small regional production expanded into global supply chains run by multinational corporations, and as demographic
and socioeconomic shifts resulted in changes in eating patterns, such as the increased consumption of fresh fruits
and vegetables.
The same technological, economic, and social changes that have transformed the food system have been mirrored,
particularly in recent years, by changes in how we think about food safety. For much of the 20th century, the food
safety system in the United States was focused on basic sanitation, chemical contaminants, and food additives. But
by the 1990s, concerns about seafood safety, and outbreaks of illnesses involving ground beef, poultry, produce, and
Year Pathogen Minimum Impact
Jan. 2009
Salmonella Typhimurium in peanut butter
and peanut paste (nearly 4,000 products
recalled)
690 ill in 46 states, more than 20
percent hospitalized, estimated nine
deaths
2009 Salmonella Newport in ground beef 800,000 lbs. of beef recalled
2009 E. coli O157:H7 in ground beef





E. coli O157:H7 in refrigerated raw cookie
dough
80 ill, 35 hospitalized, 10 severe
with Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome,
no deaths
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3 Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906 (United States Statutes at Large (59th Cong., Sess. I, Chapter 3913; cited as 34 Stat.
674)), and Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 (United States Statutes at Large (59th Cong., Sess. I, Chapter 3915; cited as 34
Stat. 768))
other products focused concerns more directly on the public health effects of pathogenic microorganisms. Pathogens
present a much different challenge than prior concerns because they can enter anywhere along the complex food
chain from production to consumption, after which they can grow or be killed.
These challenges and changes have been driven home by recent U.S. outbreaks in spinach, iceberg lettuce, green
onions, tomatoes, serrano peppers, cantaloupe, and other fresh fruits and vegetables. These outbreaks have been
acutely worrisome to consumers who often consume raw fresh fruits and vegetables (cooking often is the only way
to remove or inactivate pathogens).
Produce is increasingly associated with foodborne illnesses and outbreaks (Lynch et al. 2009, Hanning et al. 2008,
Gerner-Smidt and Whichard 2008, Rangel et al. 2005, Tauxe 1997). In an analysis of foodborne outbreaks from
1990 to 2003, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) found that 20 percent of all cases were linked to
contaminated produce (DeWaal et al 2006). The CSPI, along with the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) and
the Produce Safety Project at Georgetown University (funder of this report) have begun advocating for mandatory
and enforceable safety standards for produce sold in the United States, both domestic and imported. The FDA has
committed to proposing such a rule by October 2010. Others have gone so far as to recommend the irradiation of
leafy greens and other produce (Maki 2008, Osterholm and Norgan 2004). The GAO further has recommended
improvements needed in FDA oversight of produce safety (GAO 2008).
A Modern Food Safety System
For the past 30 years, many calls have been issued for the modernization of the food safety system. The need for
change has been voiced in a dozen or more major reports by expert bodies inside and outside of government, such
as the GAO, the NAS, the Science Board of the FDA , and the Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) (see, for example:
GAO 1992, 2001, 2004, 2005; NAS 1985, 1987, 1998, 2003; FDA Science Board 2008; TFAH 2009).
Most of these reports share a similar vision for a modern food safety system oriented toward the public health and
prevention that embraces a farm-to-table approach and that is based upon the best available science and
information. Many call for risk-based allocation of resources and the prioritization of opportunities to reduce risk,
as well as for improved coordination and integration of federal, state, and local efforts. They also recommend a
system that is more responsive to emerging issues and that is focused on stopping outbreaks quickly and effectively.
Although many have called for a more risk- and science-based food safety system, no definition of what such a
system entails is universally accepted. In general, however, it may be characterized as one that:
• Defines “risk” in public health terms. It recognizes that the primary goal of food safety policy is to protect the
public health, and, therefore, policies, programs, and analyses should measure risk as the likelihood and
severity of adverse impacts on human health.
• Prioritizes efforts and limited resources for an array of hazards. It ensures that surveillance, regulatory, and
research resources are allocated to maximize effectiveness by prioritizing opportunities and directing efforts to
address the most serious foodborne risks and achieve the greatest reductions in those risks.
• Continuously evaluates programs and policies for efficacy. It uses information it collects and analyses on the
surveillance of human disease and on food and animals to evaluate whether programs are functioning as
intended and predicted and to measure the effects of food safety interventions on public health.
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• Considers factors beyond risk. It recognizes that analyses to support resource allocation or other policy deci-
sions will never be the sole source of information that drives policy; factors such as feasibility, practicality,
cost-effectiveness, public acceptance, and other economic and social factors also play important roles in public
health decisions.
• Takes a farm-to-table approach. It recognizes that contamination can occur anywhere along the long food
supply chain and that contributing factors from primary production through final preparation can lead to
pathogen growth or decline or to cross-contamination of other foods.
• Is grounded in the principles of risk analysis. It embraces a risk-analysis framework in decisions and rule-
making, including explicit consideration of risk management, risk assessment, and risk communication. Such
assessments must be based on the best available science and undertaken in an objective, independent, and
transparent manner.
• Is data driven. It seeks and employs objective data and analysis to inform and support decisions and policies
through an information foundation that is empirical, quantitative, and real-time, with identification of data
needs and design of data systems all based on strong analytic underpinnings.
• Invests in science, data, and analysis. It is sufficiently funded to invest in improving the data and analytical
methodologies that support the assessment, comparison, and reduction of foodborne hazards, recognizing that
setting priorities involves subjective judgments and uncertainty, but that continual efforts should be made to
improve the scientific basis of those judgments and help reduce that uncertainty.
A modern food safety system is also one that is organized around a clear set of policy questions, such as:
1.What are the risks in the food supply, and where are they?
2.Which of these risks represents the greatest burden on public health?
3.What factors along the farm-to-consumption continuum affect the introduction, amplification, and reduc-
tion of pathogenic contamination?
4.Where are the opportunities to reduce risk?
5.Which interventions are feasible? Which are most cost-effective?
6.How can resources be best allocated to protect the public health?
Moreover, a modern food safety system attempts to answer such questions not through subjective opinion, but
through objective information. As Taylor and Batz (2008) wrote:
Each of the many participants in today’s food safety system has a distinct role to play, but they all have
one thing in common: the effectiveness of what they do depends on information. Up and down the line,
actors in the system depend on information about potential hazards and how to minimize them, and, in
the end, actors are only as good as the information on which they base their actions. This broader
understanding of food safety permits us—indeed, requires us—to think of the food safety system as an
information system.
Put another way, a modern food safety system is dependent upon the knowledge and information gleaned from
objective data collection, analysis, and research. This is because prevention depends upon decision-makers being able
to make informed choices despite the vast complexities in the system. Analysis is an inherently integrative tool that
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helps to make sense out of a complicated mess of signals; information from anywhere in the system–published
literature, new research, existing data programs, confidential private data–may be combined to provide insights
that would otherwise not be apparent. This is particularly true when analysis consolidates the available science
toward answering a specific risk-management question.
Improving the Information Base
In a prior report, we (working with others) described the food safety-information infrastructure (FSII) in the United
States (Taylor and Batz 2008). In that effort, we discussed the landscape of federal, state, and local agencies, private
companies and trade associations, academic research programs, and nonprofit and advocacy organizations that
comprise the food safety system and that collect and use information to make decisions. We described the challenges
preventing information from getting to the parties that need it, with a focus on public-sector decision-makers, and
we made recommendations for improving the way such information is shared across this fragmented system.
Indeed, improved data sharing has been a theme of recent efforts to reform food safety. It was a key component of
a bill introduced by then-Sen. Barack Obama,4 and it is a theme that was picked up by President Obama’s Food
Safety Working Group. In July 2009, the group identified three core principles to “guide the development of a
modern, coordinated food safety system,” the second of which was the importance of good data and analysis (FSWG
2009). The group wrote, “High-quality information will help leading agencies know which foods are at risk; which
solutions should be put into place; and who should be responsible.”
In the course of the FSII project, we became aware of efforts in other countries to improve the information base of
their food safety systems. We sought to clarify this anecdotal knowledge and gain a fuller understanding of what
activities might be underway, and we quickly identified efforts, ranging from individual research projects to major
institutional overhauls, in countries as nearby as Canada and as far away as New Zealand.
With funding from the Produce Safety Project, an initiative of the Pew Charitable Trusts at Georgetown University,
we decided to focus on a few case-study countries for which we would review the scientific literature and conduct
telephone and in-person interviews.
We decided to focus on Europe because we could examine a few individual countries there as well as the broader
European Union food safety framework. We chose the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands for our
individual countries for reasons including recommendations of colleagues and our knowledge of their programs.
For example, we were aware of the Danish program for attributing human cases of salmonellosis to animal sources
(Wegener et al. 2003) and of a large project aimed at prioritizing interventions to reduce cases of Campylobacter
in the Netherlands (Havelaar et al. 2007b). We also were familiar with a British project to analyze the relative risk
of various hazards in the food chain (FSA 2010a).
Furthermore, all three of these countries recently had undergone major reforms to their food safety institutions.
When Denmark created the Danish Zoonosis Centre (DZC) in 1994, it was the first of its kind, a cross-government
collaborative institute dedicated to integrated surveillance of pathogens in humans, food, and feed. The creation of
the Food Standards Agency (FSA) in the United Kingdom in 2000 ushered in an era of consolidation of food safety
responsibilities throughout Europe and helped drive the creation of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and
the EU approach to food safety. The Netherlands consolidated food safety in 2002 and has been a leader in risk-
based policy; it is one of just a few countries to maintain both a risk-assessment group within its regulatory agency
and a large, independent scientific institute responsible for major risk-assessment projects.
4 The Improving Food-borne Illness Surveillance and Response Act of 2008, S. 3358, 110th Cong. (2008).
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The principal goal of our informal case studies was to identify programs, policies, and projects that led to a stronger
information base for a more coordinated and integrated approach to food safety. We started with three basic
questions:
1.How have reforms in the European Union and our case-study countries affected the collection, management,
analysis, and communication of food safety information?
2.To what extent do the EU and the case-study countries employ coordinated and integrated approaches to
food safety information?
3.How are public health surveillance data and epidemiological research used within the food safety system,
particularly with respect to preventative activities?
Based on the answers to these questions, what can we learn from their experiences? And, what actions, if any, can
we take to improve the information foundation of the U.S. food safety system?
To address these questions, we examined the relevant peer-reviewed literature and read government and academic
reports on food safety data collection, research, and policymaking in Europe. We then traveled to Denmark, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom to interview experts and government officials from food safety regulatory
bodies, public health agencies, and scientific institutes, and to the extent possible, to witness their systems for
ourselves. We also conducted phone interviews with experts in the United States and in other countries and had
follow-up conversations with our European colleagues. We asked for comments on our findings and have
incorporated the feedback into our report.
Chapter 2 describes specific food safety information activities organized into distilled findings, and Chapter 3
presents recommendations to improve the science and risk basis of the U.S. food safety system, specifically by
moving toward a more coordinated and integrated approach to collecting, collating, and analyzing food safety
information. Important support materials are provided in the appendices. Appendix A provides an overview of the
European food safety system, while Appendix B provides similar overviews of the food safety systems of Denmark,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
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The past decade has been one of significant change in European food safety, both at the national and EU levels. Since
the late 1990s, many European countries have undertaken major reforms and consolidated their food safety agencies
(GAO 2005), including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. At the same time, the European Union has been making a parallel effort to centralize and harmonize its
food safety efforts (Leibovitch 2008). The 27 European Union member states are shown in Figure 1 and include
the three countries that are the focus of this report.
Figure 1: Map of the European Union, case-study countries highlighted
Appendix A provides an overview of food safety in the European Union, with a focus on how 10 years of reforms
have created a more science- and risk-based approach to food safety. It describes the motivations for reform as they
relate to science and trust and the general laws and regulations that form the basis of European food safety. The
appendix describes in some detail the important roles of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the
European Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC), as well as the information that flows between these
bodies and the EU member states.
Appendix B provides a similar overview of the food safety systems of Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom with a focus on how regulatory and institutional reform have affected information flow and scientific
analysis in support of risk-based food safety. Each of these countries has consolidated food safety authority in the
past decade, and the appendix describes the roles of and relationships among relevant institutions, with a focus on
how food safety information is collected, managed, shared, and analyzed.
Findings
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In particular, Appendix B describes Denmark’s Veterinary and Food Administration (DVFA), Statens Serum Institut
(SSI), and its National Food Institute (DTU Food) and explores the critical role of DTU Food in conducting
integrated surveillance and analysis. In The Netherlands, the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA)
and scientific institutes such as the RIKILT Institute for Food Safety and the National Institute for Public Health
and the Environment (RIVM) perform similar functions, while in the United Kingdom, the Food Standards Agency
(FSA) works closely with both the Health Protection Agency (HPA) and the Department for Environment, Food,
and Rural Affairs (Defra).
The observations described in these appendices led to nine specific findings:
Finding 1: Consolidation and centralization.
Centralization of authority at the EU level through EFSA has led to increased coordination of data
programs and increased integration of data across countries, as well as to the harmonization of
surveillance and regulation. Major differences in national food safety systems across Europe remain,
however. Some member states, including Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have
consolidated food safety authority within a single regulatory and inspection agency. These consolidations
have reduced duplication and fragmentation of efforts, but the reality of the “single food agency” has
been overstated; in all three case-study countries, key responsibilities related to food safety remain spread
across several agencies. Nevertheless, consolidation reforms have helped to clarify roles and
responsibilities and led to increased coordination and integration of food safety information.
Food scares in the 1990s, primarily BSE, or “mad cow disease,” but also outbreaks associated with other pathogens
and chemical contaminants, led to a major loss of consumer confidence in the safety of the European food supply
and the institutions charged with overseeing food safety. As a consequence, many countries consolidated their food
safety agencies and enacted major reforms to win back public support. At the same time, these scares highlighted
the need for reform at the EU level and spurred the unprecedented creation of a set of supranational laws,
regulations, and institutions dedicated to food safety. Many reforms enacted at the national level of the member states
mirrored those at the EU level.
Ten years ago, information sharing among European countries on food safety was largely ad hoc. Food was primarily
a trade issue, with obvious economic and cultural characteristics. One country had little incentive to tell another
country, for example, that one of its exported products was contaminated or to conduct surveillance of a food product
using the same analytic laboratory methods used by a neighboring country. What harmonization existed was largely
due to extensive professional networks of scientists.
The creation of EFSA in 2003 (described in Appendix A) and efforts to address Salmonella across a variety of food
chains are evidence of a new, more coordinated, integrated approach to food safety at the EU level. For example, in
EU-wide baseline surveys of numerous animal products for Salmonella (described in Finding 3), each country is
required to collect the same data using the same methodology, ensuring not only that data are comparable, but that
they address the key question of how to set an EU-wide target for the prevalence of a pathogen in a given product.
Networks of European Union and national reference laboratories facilitate analytical harmonization, and financial
and technical aid are available to countries without the necessary resources or infrastructure. Such data collection
is both coordinated–that is, designed to be able to address a policy question–and integrated–that is, eventually
pulled together in one place.
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Not all data are so precisely coordinated or of equal quality across member states, but attempts are made to integrate
the most relevant. Every year, each member country is mandated to report to EFSA its surveillance of certain
pathogens in certain products, and it is mandated to report to the ECDC its surveillance of human illnesses caused
by certain pathogens. Given differences in national public health systems and food monitoring programs, these data
are not gathered in exactly the same way. For each country, data may come from multiple programs in multiple
agencies, requiring integration at the national level. The EFSA and ECDC then compile the information into unified
annual reports, and EFSA produces a combined report. This routine updating of some of the most relevant data on
human illnesses and food contamination and their compilation in a single volume for the EU is a significant and
important example of the increased role of information in European food safety.
In addition to centralization of authority and coordination at the EU level, consolidation of food safety agencies at
the national level has been a major theme of reform in Europe during the past 10 years or so. The GAO has published
at least two reports that detail how and why countries in Europe and elsewhere have consolidated their food safety
agencies (2005, 2008). In addition to Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, other European countries
that have consolidated food safety responsibilities include Ireland, Germany, Austria, Portugal, and Spain.
As shown in Appendix B, although Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have consolidated their food
safety systems, to call them “single food agencies” might be overstating. Although most food agencies consolidate
rulemaking authority and inspection responsibilities, they still rely on other agencies to investigate outbreaks,
perform laboratory analyses, undertake bench or social science research, conduct risk assessments, and fulfill other
needs. In some cases, some relevant responsibilities are still conducted outside of the consolidated food agency, such
as oversight of imports, feed safety, animal health, pesticide residues, or veterinary drugs.
Therefore, while these European countries have reduced institutional fragmentation, this change seems to be not so
much about consolidation as about improving coordination, communication, and interaction. The reorganizations
have clarified institutional roles and more effectively delineated the relationships between institutions. We also
found, unsurprisingly, that consolidation has eased some of the burden of inter-agency communication: Fewer “turf”
battles and legal barriers mean that data are more readily shared among consolidated agencies.
A somewhat separate issue from consolidation is the independence of risk management from industry promotion.
In the United Kingdom, FSA is an independent department that is answerable to an appointed board rather than
directly reporting to a minister. In this regard, FSA is unique. In the Netherlands, although the food safety regulators
and inspectors are within the agricultural ministry, much of their funding comes from the health ministry, which may
set targets and goals for food safety. In Denmark, although food safety regulatory and inspection responsibilities are
now consolidated into a single agency, this agency falls within the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries,
which is also responsible for the promotion of Danish food and farmers.
Finding 2: Annual reports.
The EU publishes an integrated annual report that presents data collected from all member countries
on foodborne disease, foodborne outbreaks, and pathogen surveillance in food and food animals. These
reports are notable in part because they aggregate across so many countries, but also because they
combine two key types of data that are rarely presented in the same place: data on human illnesses,
which are collected through public health surveillance systems; and data on contamination of food and
food animals, which are collected by regulatory agencies. Some member countries, such as Denmark, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, routinely publish their own annual or biannual reports, which
are more extensive than the EU-wide reports. The United Kingdom also publishes an annual report on
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all science and research conducted by its FSA. These reports represent a major step forward in the
routine communication of scientific food safety information not only among governments, but with the
public, the food industry, and policymakers who use the information in planning and prioritization.
Every year, the EU publishes an integrated community report that details the surveillance of zoonotic and foodborne
pathogens in all EU member countries as well as a few other European nations (EFSA/ECDC 2008, 2009a, 2009b,
2010). These substantive reports are a significant undertaking, involving data from more than 30 countries on 10
pathogens, and they include information on foodborne outbreaks, human disease surveillance, and the monitoring
of animals, food, and feed. These annual reports are rich in data tables and graphs, but they are also professionally
produced to be approachable and readable for a wide audience. They are published in hard copy and made available
online.5 A couple of example pages from the Community Summary Report on Trends and Sources of Zoonoses and
Zoonotic Agents in the European Union in 2007 (2009a) are presented in 2.
Figure 2: Pages from the EU’s annual report on zoonoses for 2007
Source: EFSA/ECDC 2009a.
These annual reports are mandated in the EU’s General Food Law of 2002. The system for the collection of data
on pathogens in food, animals, and feed is based on the Zoonosis Directive 2003/99/EC1. This directive obligates
member states to collect relevant and, when applicable, comparable data on zoonoses, antimicrobial resistance, and
foodborne outbreaks. Countries also are required to assess trends and sources of pathogens and to transmit an
annual report to the EFSA for compilation (EFSA/ECDC 2009a). Human disease surveillance by countries and
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5 Annual EU community summary reports on zoonoses and foodborne outbreaks from 2004 through 2008 (published in
January 2010) are available from http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/scpublications.htm.
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reporting to the European Commission are defined by Decision 2000/96/EC, Decision 2119/98/EC2, and by
subsequent amendments that set up a network for epidemiological surveillance at the European Community level.
Since 2005, these data have been sent by countries to the new European Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
via TESSy, an electronic reporting network for communicable disease at the EU level (Ekdahl et al. 2007). The EFSA
and ECDC collaborate on the combined report, with the assistance of the EFSA’s Zoonoses Collaboration Centre,
which is DTU Food in Denmark. Figure 3 shows the flow of data in producing the report.
Figure 3: Data flow for EU summary reports on zoonoses
Source: adapted from EFSA/ECDC 2009a.
While EU member states are mandated to collect these data and produce reports for submission to the EU, some
also produce expanded national reports that go into significantly more detail than required by the European Union.
For example, Denmark’s annual zoonoses report presents additional topics every year (DTU Food 2007, 2009a,
2009b). The report for 2007 included the data tables submitted to the European Commission (EC), but also sections
on trends and sources (attribution) of human salmonellosis, new surveillance activities for Campylobacter, outbreaks
of special interest, and intensified control of Salmonella and Campylobacter in fresh meat (DTU Food 2009a). In
the Netherlands, the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment publishes regular reports on national
surveillance of zoonotic pathogens, as well as an annual report on trends of gastroenteritis (e.g., Pelt et al. 2008,
2009).
These annual reports, particularly at the EU level, are important. Each serves as a gateway for a tremendous amount
of information that would otherwise be impossible or immensely difficult to piece together. Indeed, many pieces of
data would not otherwise see the light of day, because the report forces countries to gather, organize, analyze, and
disseminate critical data on a regular and timely basis. Without such a report, even countries with excellent
surveillance systems might not make the effort to publish such data on a regular basis and likely would not publish
all their findings in one place. The result would be numerous reports for each country on each surveillance system
and monitoring program. By publishing data from so many countries together, and including data from multiple
years, one can see spatial distributions, as well as time trends, within countries and across Europe. For example,
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Figure 4 is drawn from the community summary report for 2008. It shows Salmonella notification rates in humans
for 24 countries across four years.
Figure 4: Example of cross-national multiyear data from an EU zoonoses report
Note: These are rates of notification, not incidence, as health systems and rates of underreporting differ between countries;
source: EFSA/ECDC 2010.
Likewise, by including human, food, animal, and feed data in one place, analysts and general readers alike can
identify patterns that might otherwise not be apparent. The production of an integrated report also pushes those
collecting and managing information to harmonize methods and standardize data systems. The reports lead to a
shared understanding of the “world” of foodborne illnesses for a given year, as everyone works from the same
numbers.
The United States has no such integrated reports on foodborne pathogens. Indeed, it does not regularly publish
reports on human surveillance of foodborne pathogens or on the monitoring of animals or foods that include data
from multiple surveillance programs. Rather, each data-collection program publishes its own data, in its own format,
in its own time, sometimes after a delay of years. For example, human surveillance data are published by CDC in
separate reports for FoodNet, OutbreakNet, and for surveillance of nationally notifiable diseases. Although FoodNet
publishes brief preliminary findings in April for the year prior (e.g., CDC 2009a, 2010), final reports sometimes are
not published for years: For example, the 2005 report (along with 2006 and 2007 reports) was not made available
until March 2010, and even then, it lacked detailed data tables.6 Traditionally, the CDC has published surveillance
summaries for foodborne outbreaks every five years or so (e.g., Bean et al. 1996; Olsen et al. 2000; Lynch et al.
2006), with summarized line-listing tables available roughly two years after the year in question (e.g., 2006 line
listings were published in 2009).7 In 2009, the CDC released a searchable database of outbreak surveillance data8
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Publication of surveillance of food and animals is even less coordinated, with multiple studies, many of them one-
time surveys and few based on randomly collected samples, conducted every year by different programs and agencies
within both FDA and the USDA.
The only clear example of a U.S. attempt to publish human, animal, and food surveillance data side-by-side is the
executive report for NARMS, the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (FDA 2009a). NARMS is
jointly run by the CDC (human surveillance), the FDA’s Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM), which deals with
retail meat, and the USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS), which deals with carcasses during slaughter. The
combined reports take a long time to produce (the 2006 report was published in October 2009).
Finding 3: Integrated surveillance and analysis.
Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom employ integrated approaches to information
management and analysis, including multi-agency databases and food attribution models that explicitly
combine and analyze data from human illness with data from food and animals. These models focus on
pathogen subtyping to link pathogen strains from humans with those from animals. These integrated
approaches to data and analysis facilitate integrated annual reports.
European countries are increasingly developing integrated approaches to managing and aggregating data that
combine information from multiple surveillance and data-collection programs. Largely predicated on pathogen
subtyping, these systems are used for integrated analysis of both human and animal-food data, particularly for the
purposes of attributing illnesses to sources.
Integrated surveillance systems
Foodborne disease surveillance and epidemiology are strong in our case-study countries of Denmark, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Many of these systems are described in detail in Appendix B. Approaches to
foodborne disease surveillance — general or sentinel, continuous or intermittent, active or passive (Wong et al.
2004) — can vary, and most countries in Europe employ multiple systems (as does the United States). These systems
generally include outbreak surveillance, passive reporting of “notifiable” diseases to the government, and active
monitoring of hospitals, physicians, and laboratories for certain pathogens (Molnar et al. 2006). Some countries also
conduct community or cohort studies to look for specific patterns.
Disease surveillance was mandated at the European level in 1998 by Decision No. 2119/98/EC. Throughout the
1990s, dedicated surveillance networks (DSNs) arose to collect data on specific diseases. By 2005, the EU had 17
largely independent and uncoordinated networks, which then became the responsibility of the ECDC. Specific to
foodborne disease, Salm-Net was created in 1994 as an electronic database for Salmonella surveillance and
harmonization of phage typing among all EU member states (Fisher 1995; Peters et al. 2003). It was replaced in
1998 by Enter-Net, which first expanded surveillance to verocytotoxin-producing E. coli (VTEC) O157 and then
to Campylobacter (Fisher 1999; Fisher and Meakins 2006; Enter-Net 2006, 2007).
The ECDC recently started using an integrated system that replaces the networks previously employed. The
European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a metadata-driven information system to collect, validate, analyze, and
disseminate surveillance data from all 27 EU member states and three other countries in the European Economic
Area. TESSy employs standardized data collection and reporting and provides a “one-stop shop” for retrieving data
on disease incidence (Amato-Gauci and Ammon 2008).
Some countries employ even greater integration of surveillance. In Denmark, for example, the Danish Zoonosis
Centre captures surveillance data, isolates, and samples from humans, animals, foods, and feed, as shown in
Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Information flow in Denmark’s integrated food and animal surveillance
Source: based on information from DTU Food
Both Europe and the United States make extensive use of pathogen subtyping in surveillance programs. In the
United States, PulseNet, a CDC-coordinated network of federal, state, and local laboratories, uses pulsed field gel
electrophoresis (PFGE) molecular fingerprinting and a shared electronic database to recognize and help contain
outbreaks of foodborne illnesses (Gerner-Smidt et al. 2006). PulseNet has been instrumental in dealing with many
large outbreaks in the United States, such as the E. coli O157:H7 outbreak in spinach in 2006 and the peanut butter
Salmonella outbreak of 2008. In both cases, PulseNet was used to link small clusters in many states as part of large
national outbreaks and to confirm that the strains found in patients matched those in contaminated products and
in samples drawn from farms.
Although no comprehensive system is in place to enable the widespread use of molecular methods for linking
outbreak clusters at the EU-level, European surveillance networks do make extensive use of pathogen subtyping,
including serotyping, phage typing, PFGE, multilocus sequence typing (MLST) and multiple loci VNTR analysis
(MLVA), and specific pathogen and subtyping method-specific databases are in use or in development. For example,
the SalmGene system is a database of PFGE patterns for Salmonella Enteritidis; it was funded in 2001 by the
European Union, hosted by the United Kingdom’s Health Protection Agency, and involved data and analysis from
nine participating countries (Fisher and Threlfall 2004). Online databases also have been developed for MLST9
and MLVA.10 Efforts have been made to develop PulseNet Europe as a viable network, including some initial EU
funding for infrastructure, but its future is unclear (Swaminathan et al. 2006). The ECDC hopes eventually to
incorporate algorithm-based cluster-detection approaches from PulseNet Europe into TESSy (Ammon and Tauxe
2007).
9 MLST databases include: http://www.mlst.net, http://pubmlst.org, http://www.pasteur.fr/mlst, and http://mlst.ucc.ie/
10 MLVA databases include: http://mlva.u-psud.fr/, http://www.mlva.eu/, http://www.miru-vntrplus.org, and
http://www.pasteur.fr/mlva
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As in the United States, subtyping has proven an invaluable component of foodborne disease surveillance in Europe,
particularly in conjunction with trace-back data. For example, in 2005, an outbreak in the Netherlands caused by
Salmonella Typhimurium DT104 was connected, via genetic fingerprinting, to an outbreak in Denmark (Kivi et al.
2007, Ethelberg et al. 2007). After noticing a spike in DT104 cases, the Netherlands initiated a novel, population-
based, case-control study and identified preprocessed raw beef as a likely source of the problem. Scientists were not
able to find any contaminated beef, but by using PFGE and MLVA patterns, Dutch authorities were able to determine
that the strain was identical to a concurrent DT104 outbreak in Denmark, which had been traced to imported
Italian beef carpaccio. The Danes were able to match a restaurant outbreak to data from extensive microbiological
testing of imported meat products. A complex trace-back investigation was initiated through the Rapid Alert System
for Food and Feed, and the beef was traced from Italy to some Dutch processors, who distributed it within the
Netherlands, as well as in other countries. Eventually, the product was re-imported to the Netherlands, further
processed, and exported to Denmark, where it caused the outbreak. In addition to these two outbreaks, the same
meats were distributed throughout Europe, where they also likely caused illnesses that were never identified as
connected (Ammon and Tauxe 2007).
Integrated attribution analysis
Preventive food safety policy requires that decision-makers have a holistic understanding of the determinants of
foodborne illnesses, including which etiologic agents are causing illness and via which foods. Likewise, the burden
of illness associated with specific pathogens and foods is necessary to properly evaluate the effectiveness of
interventions in particular food chains. For both of these reasons, the growing consensus is that the attribution of
human illnesses to specific sources and food vehicles is critical to effective food safety systems (Batz et al. 2005,
FAO/WHO 2006, Pires et al. 2009).
Methods for food and source attribution are numerous (Batz et al. 2005, Pires et al 2009), but those with the most
promise are integrated approaches that take advantage of data from both human disease surveillance and from the
monitoring of animals and food. Surveillance data often lack confirmation of the food vehicle that led to illness
(except for some percentage of outbreaks) and generally provide only information about the pathogen. Likewise,
monitoring data include no information about which contaminated foods ultimately led to illness, and simple
extrapolations would be invalid. Individually, these data have limited value for attribution, but have tremendous
value when combined.
One powerful example of this is the attribution model developed as part of the Danish Salmonella program (Hald
et al. 2004). This integrated model uses serotyping and phage typing of human isolates and of samples drawn from
monitoring programs of food and animals to essentially link matching “distinctive” strains from both databases. A
mathematical model then attributes domestically acquired human Salmonella infections according to the prevalence
of these strains in animals and consumption information. Researchers within the Danish Zoonosis Centre in DTU
Food have been performing these analyses since 1994 and using the results to determine intervention strategies and
to measure the efficacy of their control programs (Mølbak 2004).
The Netherlands also has been using subtyping for 25 years to explicitly attribute cases of salmonellosis to food and
animal sources, although it uses a simpler model than Denmark given its data availability (Pelt et al. 1999). In the
United Kingdom, MLST is being used to connect Campylobacter jejuni isolates from humans to food animals that
may serve as host species (Dingle et al. 2002, Didelot and Falush 2007, McCarthy et al. 2007). In New Zealand,
researchers have used similar MLST approaches and modified the Danish “Hald model” for both Campylobacter
and Salmonella (Kwan et al. 2008, French 2007, Mullner et al., 2009). EFSA has recently published a scientific
opinion on source attribution of Campylobacter (EFSA 2010a).
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It is important to note, however, that these subtyping attribution models are “reservoir” models that attribute
illnesses only to animal reservoirs of zoonotic pathogens: That is, they do not attribute to the pathway of exposure
or to the food vehicle at the time of exposure. The illnesses caused by the 2006 E. coli O157:H7 outbreak from
contaminated spinach, for example, would have likely been attributed, in such a broad end-of-year analysis, to
beef. Considering the importance of vegetables, fruit, and other nonanimal products associated with foodborne
outbreaks and sporadic cases of illness, the subtyping approach has serious limitations (Batz et al. 2005).
Another approach that uses both microbiological and epidemiological data is comparative risk or exposure
assessment. In such an approach, the human exposure to a particular pathogen is estimated for a set of sources,
which may include food, water, and environmental routes. For each source, a mathematical model estimates
exposures or illnesses based on pathogen prevalence or levels in that source (drawn from microbial surveys) and other
factors, such as the growth or reduction in pathogen levels along the transmission route, food consumption patterns,
and dose-response functions (Pires et al. 2008). For such models to be useful for attribution, the set of sources or
routes modeled must be reasonably comprehensive, as attribution is based on relative differences in estimated
exposure between routes.
The premiere use of exposure assessments for source attribution was conducted in the Netherlands for
Campylobacter as part of the Dutch Campylobacter Risk Management and Assessment (CARMA) project (Evers et
al. 2008). This model covered 31 transmission routes, including direct contact with animals and water, in addition
to foodborne sources. The ranked results of the exposure assessment are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Ranking of Campylobacter transmission routes in Dutch exposure assessment
Source: Nauta et al. (2005).
As noted, in many European countries, the integrated analysis of food and human data is eased by these data being
maintained within the same institution. Researchers and epidemiologists spoke of numerous small investigative
studies in addition to the large attribution work just described and indicated that these smaller investigations would
often come about because when they had a question, they could go “down the hall” to look at the necessary data.
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In the United States, data are largely disconnected, and integrated attribution studies are limited. The CDC maintains
data on human illnesses, while the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), its Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS), and its Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) along with FDA’s Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) and other agencies maintain animal and food data. Although agencies sometimes
work together on such data, human and animal data generally are collected and analyzed in isolation.
For example, PulseNet primarily contains PFGE patterns for a number of pathogens isolated from human cases of
foodborne illnesses, although it also includes food isolates collected by FDA and some isolates drawn from food and
animals during outbreak investigations. The USDA maintains VetNet, which contains PFGE patterns for pathogens
isolated from food animals. Although CDC (which manages PulseNet) and USDA have a memorandum of
understanding, and although VetNet was created some years ago in part to explicitly connect with PulseNet to
answer questions of attribution, examples of such collaboration are limited. After five years of PulseNet and VetNet
collecting similar and potentially connected data in parallel, no integrated studies comparing strains in these
databases have been published.
FSIS and CDC did collaborate on an effort to apply the Danish attribution model using human isolates from the
Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS) and animal data from the FSIS in-plant sampling (Guo
2007). The results were of limited value, however, because of serious gaps in data across reservoirs and in available
subtyping information.
The FDA, FSIS, and CDC also collaborated on a suite of 23 risk assessments for Listeria monocytogenes in ready-
to-eat foods, including deli meats, dairy, produce, and seafood (CFSAN 2003). These risk assessments were not
designed for attribution purposes (rather, for identifying and evaluating interventions), but the project did include
significant integration of data and collaboration. Subsequently, the FSIS initiated a comparative-risk assessment for
Listeria monocytogenes in prepackaged and retail-sliced deli meats and has recently embarked with the FDA on an
interagency risk assessment to identify and evaluate additional interventions for retail-sliced deli meats (FSIS 2009,
Kause 2009).
Finding 4: Coordinated data collection.
The European Union employs standardized EU-wide baseline surveys to estimate the prevalence and
levels of pathogenic contamination in arrays of foods and sets minimum requirements for routine
pathogen surveillance for selected pathogens and food animals. These coordinated studies are used to
set targets and develop microbial standards in food-animal production. Some member countries, such
as Denmark, maintain more extensive routine monitoring programs than required by the EU. These
coordinated food-animal surveillance systems have been critical to enabling integrated analysis.
Monitoring programs across Europe vary widely. Some countries manage extensive, ongoing monitoring throughout
the farm-to-table chain on a variety of animals and food products, as does Denmark for Salmonella. These
coordinated sampling programs are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of control measures and to support
integrated and combined analysis to estimate attribution of disease to specific animals. The success of the subtyping
program largely depends on the intensity of the monitoring programs.
In addition, DTU Food and Denmark’s Veterinary and Food Administration conduct surveys on specific food items.
For example, in 2006, they conducted 14 microbiological studies, small and large: 100 samples in bivalve mollusks
tested for Salmonella and E. coli; 500 samples in frozen imported berries tested for Salmonella, Campylobacter, and
E. coli; 1,000 samples of fresh, chilled, retail pork tested for Salmonella and Yersinia; and more than 3,400 samples
of imported poultry, beef, and pork tested for multiresistent Salmonella Typhimurium DT104 (DTU Food 2007).
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Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, perform routine monitoring, but more frequently
conduct food surveys as needed. In such surveys, authorities are looking for emerging problems or want to quantify
contamination rates of pathogens in specific types of products. For example, the United Kingdom’s FSA published
38 food surveys from 2006 through 2009, including studies on Campylobacter and Salmonella in retail chicken,
Listeria monocytogenes in smoked fish, and Salmonella in raw eggs.11
The European Union has embarked on a comprehensive approach to reducing illnesses caused by Salmonella and
Campylobacter based upon coordinated and integrated data collection, EU-wide target setting, and national-level
control programs. This approach focuses on gathering data across and within all major animal food chains for each
EU member state and using risk assessments to determine prevalence targets. Prevalence data are based upon
baseline monitoring programs that are methodologically harmonized at the EU level but instituted by the competent
authorities in each member state. Animal categories targeted for 2004-2008 included breeding flocks, laying hens,
broilers, turkeys, slaughter pigs, and breeding pigs. This comprehensive process continues, with the European
Commission going down the line of products in a slow but systematic manner (e.g., EFSA 2008b, 2009c, 2010b).
These data are then fed into quantitative microbial risk-assessment models developed to estimate the effects on
human health of reductions in Salmonella prevalence in these products. Risk assessments for Salmonella in pigs,
pork, and laying hens are expected to be published in 2010, while another for Salmonella in broiler chickens began
in 2009. These risk models will then be used to support the setting of EU-wide targets for all these animal products.
Although certain member countries (namely those with a high prevalence of Salmonella in shell eggs) have pushed
back, most people we spoke with were supportive of the direction and rate of these programs.
In the United States, monitoring programs, baseline studies, and food surveys are conducted by agencies and
programs within FDA and USDA. For example, APHIS oversees the National Animal Health Monitoring System
(NAHMS), which conducts national studies on animal health and health-management practices in livestock and
poultry production. Many of these studies are unrelated to food safety, but they do include some studies of human
pathogens in animal production. Similarly, FSIS conducts baseline studies of human pathogens in raw meat and
poultry products12 and has regulatory (verification) microbiological testing programs for certain pathogens in animal
food products.13 The AMS conducts surveys of human pathogens and pesticide residues in fruit and vegetables.14 In
addition to these USDA programs, FDA conducts retail surveys and has its own microbiological-data-collection
programs within CFSAN and CVM. The USDA and FDA also collaborate with CDC in NARMS. These programs
generate important and useful data, but are not coordinated; they are not part of a comprehensive program to
determine, for example, the prevalence of Salmonella subtypes across all food types (or other vectors, such as reptiles
or environmental exposure) in order to prioritize interventions.
Finding 5: Independent scientific institutes.
In all three case-study countries, risk assessment is housed in independent governmental science bodies
that are separate from risk-management agencies. These bodies maintain the lead roles in data collection
and analyses and are responsible for both the surveillance of human illness and data on microbiological
hazards in animals, food, and feed. This arrangement creates a critical mass of information and
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In all three case-study countries, the same scientific bodies are responsible for collecting and analyzing surveillance
data on human illness and data on pathogen contamination of food and animals. The RIVM in the Netherlands, DTU
Food in Denmark, and the HPA in the United Kingdom manage surveillance data on human illnesses, collect data
on pathogens in animals and food, and maintain clinical and food laboratories that are central to their national
surveillance systems. These institutes serve as natural locus points for food safety data and analysis. As a result, they
conduct advanced attribution studies and other analyses that combine these many sources of data.
This is in contrast to the United States, which has a fragmented, disconnected system in which data are collected
and maintained by many agencies and programs that may or may not communicate effectively (Taylor and Batz
2008). The CDC is the federal agency solely responsible for collecting human data, but it conducts no research or
data collection on the prevalence of pathogens in food or food animals. The USDA and FDA conduct independent
research on the contamination of animal carcasses and other foods in processing and retail, but even these studies
may be conducted by a variety of agencies such as APHIS, ARS, and AMS within USDA and CVM and CFSAN
within FDA. Data sharing among these agencies is improving, but remains an obstacle to data integration.
Another difference between the United States and the European Union is that in the EU, and in Denmark, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, risk assessment is explicitly separated from risk-management agencies,
meaning that those providing scientific evaluation of foodborne hazards are situated independently, both
organizationally and physically, from those choosing among policy alternatives. Although EFSA is tasked with
providing independent scientific advice, it does not set regulatory policy. Likewise, the RIVM and DTU Food are
independent scientific research and advisory institutes that perform risk assessments and other analyses for the
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority and the Veterinary and Food Administration, respectively. In the
United Kingdom, FSA employs scientific advisory committees (SACs) comprised of independent, external experts
to conduct risk assessments. It also contracts data collection and analyses to the HPA and the Defra.
The separation of risk assessment and risk management is intended to ensure the scientific quality and independence
of scientific analysis and to provide greater transparency to consumers about food safety policymaking. It is intended
to increase the public’s confidence that the science is free from political influence, and it was motivated by the BSE
crisis, in which government scientists knew about a problem but did not publicly announce it.
One concern about such a separation might be that risk assessments could diverge from risk management needs
because of the distance required for communication. In our conversations, we found the opposite, however: The
elucidation of responsibilities provided by institutional separation has forced managers to be clearer in defining
risk-management questions, and it has freed risk assessors to make methodological choices based on the science,
rather than the preferences of the risk manager.
A second concern is timelines — that this separation could impede the ability of risk managers to get quick answers
in time-critical situations. In reality, however, risk-assessment agencies are in regular communication with risk-
management agencies and are expected to be responsive in such circumstances. Nonetheless, in the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom, FSA and VWA maintain analytical units in part to address such situations. In Denmark,
DVFA does not maintain a risk-analysis unit, but any concern that might create is addressed principally through
proximity: The agency is located, literally, across the courtyard from DTU Food.
Scientific research and risk assessment are conducted differently in the United States. Both the USDA and the FDA
maintain in-house risk-assessment groups and laboratories and manage their own data-collection programs, such
as retail surveys or baseline studies of animal carcasses’ pathogen prevalence. The FDA maintains intramural
research programs within CFSAN and CVM, and it supports some university-based research centers. The USDA’s
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intramural research is conducted by ARS, while the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) funds grant-
based extramural research; neither is answerable to the risk managers in FSIS. For projects beyond agency capacities,
USDA and FDA maintain “umbrella contracts” with large consulting firms, which conduct task orders themselves
or subcontract projects to smaller firms or university-based researchers.
To be clear, by noting these differences, we do not suggest that risk assessments in the United States are of low
scientific quality or that they have been tainted by political influence. We do feel, however, that the institutional
separation of risk assessment and risk management in case-study countries provides incentives for increased
independence, scientific quality, and a clarified role of science in policymaking.
Finding 6: Coordinated research priorities.
Although research and data collection are largely conducted by independent scientific and risk-
assessment institutes and agencies in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, much of the
funding for these activities flows through policy and risk-management agencies. Regulatory decision-
makers, therefore, set broad priorities for scientific programs across government agencies and ensure
that research, data collection, analyses, and reporting are responsive to policymakers’ needs.
As described previously, the food safety systems of Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom rely upon
independent institutes for scientific and risk-assessment expertise. At the same time, while these scientific advisory
institutes are independent, they rely upon risk-management agencies for significant portions of their funding. The
RIVM and the RIKILT in the Netherlands, DTU Food and DTU Vet in Denmark, and HPA and Defra in the United
Kingdom conduct most of their analytical work under contract to VWA, DVFA, and FSA, respectively.
By controlling the purse strings, risk-management agencies can ensure that the work of independent institutes is
directly responsive to their needs. The FSA, VWA, and DVFA regularly contract out work to independent researchers
in universities or nonprofit research institutes, although this remains a rather small portion of their research funding
stream. At the same time, institutes such as RIVM, DTU Food, and HPA maintain discretionary budgets that they
can use to address issues or questions they deem important, regardless of the interest of risk managers. These
institutions also fund research through competitive grant programs at the national, EU, and international level.
In the United States, some food safety research and analysis is conducted within or contracted out by FDA’s CFSAN
or USDA’s FSIS and is directly responsive to risk-management needs. In-house risk assessments are one such
example. Most food safety data collection and analysis funded by the federal government, however, is not coordinated
by these risk-management agencies and has been criticized for not being responsive enough to policymakers’ needs
(Taylor and Batz 2008). The large food safety research programs within the USDA’s ARS and its National Institute
of Food and Agriculture are not guided by FDA or by FSIS. Although the agencies do provide input to program
priorities (a situation that has improved dramatically during the past few years), research decisions within ARS are
ultimately the subjective decisions of program management, while funding decisions for the NIFA competitive grants
are made by review panels principally on the merits of the science. Similarly, the collection of food safety data and
research conducted by other agencies, such as APHIS and AMS in USDA, and CVM in FDA, is not coordinated or
prioritized based on the needs of risk managers in FSIS and CFSAN . The FDA and FSIS influence over the research
programs within CDC is limited. Although FDA andFSIS participate in CDC programs such as PulseNet and
FoodNet, most of the epidemiological research and analyses done by the agency is conducted independently.
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Finding 7: Basis in risk analysis.
The EU and many member countries, including Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,
embrace risk analysis as a formal process to inform food safety policy and decision-making, including
specific delineation of responsibilities for risk management, risk assessment, and risk communication. For
microbial hazards, this has largely resulted in more data-driven policy, as mandatory risk assessments
have required scientific support and data collection. Public health surveillance data are used by the
EFSA and some member states in policymaking and decision contexts, including priority setting, resource
allocation, policy development, and program management.
Risk analysis is a foundational principle of EU food law and is the approach taken by Denmark, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom. It is one of the primary principles listed in a European Commission white paper (2000),
and its use is laid out in Article 6 of the General Food Law of 2002:
1.In order to achieve the general objective of a high level of protection of human health and life, food law shall
be based on risk analysis except where this is not appropriate to the circumstances or the nature of the
measure.15
2.Risk assessment shall be based on the available scientific evidence and undertaken in an independent,
objective, and transparent manner.
Through its reliance on risk analysis, the EU has created a consistent framework for integrating scientific analysis
into decision-making. This consensus approach means that the EU has a common language for approaching food
safety issues.
In addition to quantitative and qualitative risk assessments conducted by EFSA, the Danish DZC, the Dutch RIVM
and RIKILT, and Defra and HPA in the United Kingdom, European institutions have conducted studies to help set
priorities. These applied analyses rely upon public health data from surveillance programs and related research and
are used extensively by risk-management agencies in these countries. There are specific examples of the use of
disease surveillance and advanced risk assessment to prioritize efforts, allocate resources, evaluate existing programs,
and identify intervention opportunities.
More than any other European country, the Netherlands has pursued priority setting based upon estimates of disease
burden for various foodborne pathogens. For some major pathogens, it estimates the annual number of foodborne
illnesses and quantifies the effects of these illnesses by using integrated measures of disease burden such as Disability
Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) and economic measures (Kemmeren et al. 2006, Havelaar et al 2007, Haagsma et al.
2009). The Netherlands intends to conduct these analyses annually. Data for these studies are also accessible on-
line (primarily in Dutch) at the National Public Health Compass, a gateway to information about health and disease,
risk factors, and care and prevention in the Netherlands.16 These studies have affected national policy. In 2006
estimates (Kemmeren et al.), the Netherlands found that Toxoplasma gondii had the second largest effect on the
public health of all foodborne pathogens. As a consequence, the VWA has pursued research aimed at reducing
toxoplasmosis, including a study starting in 2008 to evaluate on-farm interventions and treatments during food
processing.
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15 As discussed in Appendix A, the EU follows the “precautionary principle” for risks for which scientific evidence is deemed
insufficient to evaluate risk. In practical terms, this has been relevant for hot-button issues such as GMOs and hormones,
where risk assessments have found low risks but where significant portions of the public are nonetheless opposed. The only
foodborne disease for which the precautionary principle has been relevant is “mad cow disease,” or new variant Creutzfeldt–
Jakob disease (nvCJD), because of consuming cattle with BSE.
16 http://www.nationaalkompas.nl
The CARMA project is another example of the Dutch approach. This large, complex, multi-institution project,
centered at the RIVM, was a comprehensive attempt to estimate the burden of Campylobacter by various food and
environmental routes and to design and evaluate potential interventions (Nauta et al. 2005). It included an array
of 31 exposure assessments for various food and non-food routes, supplementary expert elicitations, examinations
of 22 specific interventions from farm through preparation, detailed simulation models of chicken-processing lines
and cross-contamination during preparation, and cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit studies. The primary project
components are shown in Figure 7. CARMA identified some interventions, but policymakers are holding off on
additional regulation until data can be validated (following industry concerns), and, possibly, until the European
Commission acts based on a risk-assessment being conducted by the EFSA.
Figure 7: Primary analytical and data elements in the Dutch CARMA project
Notes: Dashed lines show information flows into and out of the project. Risk-assessment process and data-collection activities
are iterative as analysis is refined.
Source: adapted from Havelaar et al. (2005).
In the United Kingdom, FSA employs risk analysis to prioritize its efforts. For example, analysts have supported
resource allocation by developing risk profiles to target hygiene inspections toward high-risk premises, conducted
risk-assessment modeling to identify interventions that would have the greatest impact in reducing foodborne disease,
and performed analyses to evaluate existing BSE controls. These efforts use data on surveillance and other
information to improve or measure the efficiency of the FSA’s activities.
The FSA recently conducted a “food chain analysis” in response to a request from the FSA board to examine risk
throughout the food chain (Brown and Cooper 2008, FSA 2010a). This study included two parts: a broad
examination of the full food chain and detailed analyses of specific food chains to identify controls. Broad analyses
included efforts to identify high-risk areas to inform strategic planning, points in the food chain with misalignment
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of controls to risks, data gaps, and risk areas requiring more detailed analysis. Detailed analyses of Campylobacter
in the chicken food chain and VTEC in the beef and lamb food chains were used to identify and evaluate potential
controls. These analyses were used in the development of FSA’s Strategy for 2010-2015 and its Science and Evidence
Strategy 2010-2015 (2009, 2010b).
The FSA also has invested directly in disease surveillance to evaluate its performance as an agency with respect to
achieving disease-reduction targets. For example, a primary driver for funding the IID2 study on infectious intestinal
disease in the United Kingdom (described in Appendix B),17 was for FSA to attempt to measure progress in disease
rates since the first IID study in the 1990s (FSA 2000).
As described previously, the Danish Salmonella program uses disease surveillance, food and animal monitoring,
and advanced attribution methods to attribute cases of salmonellosis to specific food-animal reservoirs. Denmark
uses these data to evaluate the performance of Salmonella controls in poultry, pork, beef, and eggs and to determine
whether they need to pursue additional interventions (Wegener et al. 2003). Surveillance data are therefore directly
used for policy development and accountability of program management.
At the EU level, public health surveillance data have been used to identify the top Salmonella “serotypes of public
health significance” for use in Salmonella programs, just as similar data on serotypes in foods and animals have been
used.
Another example of Europe’s risk-based approach involves imports. As described by the GAO (2008), the EU and
member countries have shifted from random, routine sampling during inspection of imports to a risk-based approach
that targets resources according to food type, country of origin, and other factors. This approach is geared toward
hazards of particular health concern and the food products with which they are associated, such as aflatoxins in corn,
wheat, nuts, and beans, or pesticide residues on certain fresh fruits and vegetables. In Denmark, when a lot of
imported meat is found to be contaminated with a pathogen, analysts conduct a same-day, case-by-case risk
assessment based on the level of contamination to estimate the specific public health effect were the meat to be
allowed into commerce. If the public health effects are above a specific threshold, the meat is rejected (Christensen
2010).
Risk analysis is also practiced extensively in the United States by both FDA and FSIS. As noted previously, both
agencies maintain risk-assessment groups, which conduct analyses on agency data, principally in the form of
quantitative microbial risk assessments. These have included risk assessments on different pathogen-product
pathways and have been used to support rulemaking and, in the case of FSIS, inspection activities. These risk
assessments include extensive outreach plans and are quite robust. Neither agency has published any broad priority
setting analyses, however, which could be considered the equivalent of the ones done in the Netherlands or the
United Kingdom. The U.S. groups do conduct analyses to support internal decision-making, but most are not
published or available for review.
Finding 8: Transparency and public participation.
Transparency and public participation are key principles of European food safety systems, particularly
of the EFSA and the United Kingdom’s FSA, and are a means of gaining and maintaining public
confidence. To increase transparency and participation, agencies coordinate with stakeholders and
advisory committees, hold open management meetings, and publish extensively, including meeting
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minutes, evidence and analyses supporting decisions, and extensive planning and prioritization
documents.
The EFSA’s activities are guided by four key values, preserved in its founding regulation: scientific excellence,
independence, relevance, and transparency and openness. Transparency and openness are seen as critical to citizen
trust, particularly following the perceived opaqueness of many of the decisions made by European governments
during the BSE crisis of the 1990s. Ways that EFSA attempts to be transparent and open include (Koeter 2004):
• Making management board meetings public.
• Publishing agendas and minutes for meetings of the management board, the advisory forum, the scientific
committee, the scientific panels, and working groups.
• Webcasting meetings when possible.
• Publishing all scientific advice on the Web.
• Publishing names and affiliations of all panel members and experts.
• Maintaining a transparent process for the selection of experts.
• Holding discussion meetings with stakeholders.
• Disseminating information to multiple audiences.
The EFSA conducts research on the public’s risk perception through the ongoing Eurobarometer study and works
to bridge gaps between science and the consumer. It has published guidance and strategic planning documents on
transparency, openness, and risk communication (e.g., EFSA 2003, 2005, 2006b, 2009d). In 2006, EFSA published
an opinion on transparency in procedural aspects of risk assessment pertaining to how requests are handled, how
independent scientists are selected, aspects of confidentiality, involvement of stakeholders, and more. In April 2009,
it published an opinion on transparency in the scientific aspects of risk assessment. This new set of principles is
principally focused on clarity of scientific explanations so that the scope, data types, data decisions, assumptions,
calculations, and conclusions are intelligible to nontechnical audiences.
The United Kingdom’s FSA similarly identifies openness as one of its four key values, the others being putting the
consumer first, independence, and being science- and evidence-based. It follows a detailed policy on openness,
which specifies the principles and means by which FSA will maintain transparency.18 A 2005 independent review
of FSA’s performance found that stakeholders’ perceptions of the agency’s efforts to be transparent and accessible
were generally positive (FSA 2005). Like EFSA, FSA’s board meetings are public, with minutes and all material and
handouts available on the Web.
In the United States, policies concerning transparency and public participation are less consistent, although they are
improving. For example, USDA and FDA already publish agendas, presentations, and minutes for advisory
committees such as the National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria of Foods (NACMCF) and FDA’s
Risk Communication Advisory Committee, as well as for most public meetings. The FDA’s and FSIS’s quantitative
microbiological risk assessments tend to have well-defined stakeholder outreach plans, with public meetings
throughout the process. In the risk assessments conducted for Listeria from 1999-2003, for example, the two
agencies held four large public meetings at key stages in the process and made numerous announcements via their
18 http://www.food.gov.uk/aboutus/how_we_work/copopenbranch/
33
BUILDING THE SCIENCE FOUNDATION OF A MODERN FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM
LESSONS FROM DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM ON CREATING A MORE COORDINATED AND
INTEGRATED APPROACH TO FOOD SAFETY INFORMATION
The Produce Safety Project at Georgetown University • www.producesafetyproject.org
Web sites and in the Federal Register (see FDA/FSIS 2003, Appendix 1). For analyses that are not “full-blown” risk
assessments, however, public meetings are less likely, and the data, models, and supporting analyses also are less
likely to be made available to the public. Recently, the transparency of the FSIS’s decision-making was questioned
following a New York Times story on the use of ammonia in processed beef (Moss 2009a, 2009b, Anderson 2010).
In the past year, FDA and USDA have made advances in improving policies for transparency and risk
communication. In fall 2009, the FDA published a strategic plan for risk communication, which was intended to
provide the agency with a coherent and consistent approach. The document lists three strategic goals: strengthen
the science that supports effective risk communication; expand FDA’s capacity to generate, disseminate, and oversee
effective risk communication; and optimize FDA policies on communicating risks and benefits (FDA 2009b). The
FDA has also created a transparency task force to “develop recommendations for making useful and understandable
information about FDA activities and decision-making more readily available to the public in a timely manner and
in a user-friendly format” (FDA 2010). In April 2010, USDA released an Open Government Plan and an associated
Web site (USDA 2010).19
Finding 9: Traceability.
Mandatory traceability is a foundational principle of EU food safety law; all food and feed must be
traceable “one-up, one-down,” by food and feed businesses, including importers. Unlike in the United
States, primary producers and restaurants are not excluded from these requirements, and mandatory
animal-identification systems are in place for livestock. The EU has invested €100 million in nine
traceability research projects, including efforts aimed at developing integrated traceability systems and
harmonizing existing systems.
Traceability is a major component of EU food safety, originally laid out in the General Food Law, and requirements
have been increasingly specified over time (EC 2007, 2010). The European Commission requires business operators
to maintain the names and addresses of the suppliers and customers of all food and feed they handle. Business
operators are encouraged to keep additional information, too, such as how much volume they handle, batch numbers,
and more detailed descriptions of products (such as raw or processed). This “one-up, one-down,” approach to trace-
back requires each member country to monitor business operators and set penalties if the operators fail to meet these
requirements. Certain categories of products, such as produce, beef, fish, honey, and olive oil, have additional
requirements. Rates of compliance among relevant firms is unknown, but differences among countries have been
documented (IFT 2010).
The U.S. and European Union approaches to traceability are fairly similar, although the EU requirements are more
extensive. The European Union’s traceability requirements apply to all businesses trading food and feed from
primary production through final sale to consumers and include farmers and brokers of bulk commodities. By
contrast, the United States does not require recordkeeping in primary production or for animal feed and exempts
some types of firms, such as nonprofit food establishments and small retailers (IFT 2010). As in Europe, compliance
has been lacking; in a recent audit, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) found that nearly 60 percent of inspected food facilities failed FDA requirements, and 25 percent were not
even aware of traceability requirements (HHS 2009). The OIG was only able to fully trace 12.5 percent of examined




BUILDING THE SCIENCE FOUNDATION OF A MODERN FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM
LESSONS FROM DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM ON CREATING A MORE COORDINATED AND
INTEGRATED APPROACH TO FOOD SAFETY INFORMATION
The Produce Safety Project at Georgetown University • www.producesafetyproject.org
The EU has mandatory animal-identification systems for livestock and maintains a central database for tracking
animals within the EU and from non-EU countries. The United States recently scrapped its National Animal
Identification System (NAIS), a voluntary program that was announced in late 2003 following the first confirmed
U.S. case of BSE. The USDA spent more than $120 million on the NAIS, but because of opposition by the cattle
industry and other issues, it achieved a participation rate of only 36 percent. Instead of the NAIS, the USDA recently
announced that it will create a “flexible” state-led program for animals that are entering interstate commerce (APHIS
2010).
In addition to such traceability programs, the EU maintains the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF).
RASFF was created by Article 50 of the General Food Law of 2002 to replace other systems (EC 2009). Now,
whenever a member country is aware of a serious direct or indirect risk to human health because of a contaminated
farm or feed, it is obligated to report the problem to the EC via the rapid alert system; the information then is
quickly communicated to the other EU member states via an online database. The information flows of the RASFF
are captured in Figure 8. The system is used extensively in multinational recalls and trace-back investigations, and
it is connected with INFOSAN, a global alert system managed jointly by the World Health Organization and the
United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization.
Figure 8: Schematic representation of RASFF information flow
Source: RASFF 2008 Annual Report (EC 2009).
A few cases in Europe have shown that these traceability requirements can be critical. In 2004, milk from a single
Dutch farm was found to have high levels of dioxin. A trace-back investigation discovered that potato peels used as
cattle feed were contaminated, and furthermore that they had been contaminated during processing using clay,
which was used to separate high- and low-quality potatoes. The RASFF was used to notify other countries, as the
contaminated clay had been supplied to food processing companies in Belgium, France, and Germany. More than
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200 farms were eventually barred from trade, and contaminated products never reached consumers (EC 2005). In
other cases, European investigators could not trace back products because of improper recordkeeping.
In the United States, electronic networks facilitate interstate communication, and multistate outbreaks or recalls
involve federal agencies (Taylor and Batz 2008). Coordination and communication roles are established among the
CDC, the FDA, and the FSIS and with the states in large outbreaks or recalls. Efforts continue to improve this
protocol (CIFOR 2009). In many cases, multistate outbreaks were identified not via federal regulatory involvement,
but through surveillance programs such as PulseNet and OutbreakNet. PulseNet, in particular, has the power to
connect clusters of human illnesses across state lines, and it has been a valuable tool in many of the large outbreaks
in recent years. Indeed, outbreaks that may have been reported as small and disconnected with unknown sources
were instead connected into one outbreak and eventually traced to food products. Without an active Europe-wide
surveillance system such as PulseNet, the EU is much less likely to identify multinational outbreaks.
The European Union has made significant investments in improving traceability. At least €114 million have been
granted to nine traceability research projects, including the TRACE project, aimed at developing integrated
traceability systems with a focus on food authenticity20; the FoodTrace project, intended to develop a generic
identification framework and network of databases to share information21; TRACEBACK, an attempt to create a
standardized traceability system based on nanotech devices and integrated network architecture22; and BIOTRACER,
which has the objective of creating tools and models for improved tracing of accidental and intentional microbial
contamination of feed and food.23 Additional projects are aimed at developing novel approaches for food verification:
DNA-TRACK,24 GoeTraceAgri,25 and OLIV-TRACK.26 Furthermore, the EU has created an international forum,
Promoting European Traceability Excellence and Research (PETER), to promote discussion among projects, to
harmonize efforts, and to disseminate findings.27









Based on the findings outlined in Chapter 2, we have identified a number of opportunities to bolster the foundation
of food safety information in the United States.
The Case for Major Institutional Reform
Although we make six recommendations for specific actions that should be taken to improve the U.S. food safety
system, we feel it is important to also explore the potential benefits of more significant structural transformation.
In particular, we discuss two major institutional reforms that would significantly improve the likelihood of achieving
a science-based, risk-informed, data-driven, food safety system.
Prior work has described the U.S. food safety information infrastructure as fragmented, uncoordinated, and largely
disconnected (Taylor and Batz 2008). Technical obstacles hinder data aggregation, but the most pressing and
intractable challenges to collaboration and data sharing are institutional. As described in Finding 1, the consolidation
of the food safety authority in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, and the centralization of
authority at the EU level, along with additional reforms, have led to a more coordinated and integrated approach
to food safety information. The eight European nations that have consolidated regulatory and/or inspection agencies
have reported efficiencies, greater information sharing, and improved consumer confidence.
We found that reforms aimed at consolidating food safety authority were critically important in building a
strengthened role for information-driven analysis and decision-making in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom. We have come to believe that while our specific recommendations will go far to improve the risk basis of
the U.S. food safety system, some of the most difficult and intractable challenges relate to the fragmented,
disconnected, and uncoordinated nature of our major food safety institutions.
Thus, while it would be premature to recommend an overhaul of U.S. food safety institutions based on three brief
case studies, our findings do suggest that institutional reform has played a critically important role in improving the
risk-basis of European food safety. Likewise, the creation of a Cabinet-level food safety agency in the United States
might be a major, or even necessary, step toward achieving the vision of a science- and risk-based food safety system.
To be effective, such a Cabinet-level agency would need to coordinate regulatory and inspection programs of USDA
and FDA food safety offices, maintain funding lines to agencies to ensure appropriate data inflows, and have broad
authority to allocate resources, prioritize preventative efforts, and coordinate data collection and research. This
agency should be mandated to employ a risk-analysis framework in food safety decision-making, recognizing the
importance of and the need to consider additional factors such as social values, economic impacts, and political
interests.
Similarly, although the scientific risk analyses conducted within the FDA and the FSIS are of high quality, expertise
is spread across two rather small divisions and remains separated from the epidemiologists within CDC’s foodborne
group. The separation of data and analytical capacity among CDC, FDA, and FSIS makes it nearly impossible to
maintain integrated programs geared toward linking human and food-animal surveillance data. Although we
recommend specific actions to attempt to bridge the serious divides among agencies, our findings in Denmark, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom show the strength of maintaining single institutes to oversee scientific advice.
Combined with a Cabinet-level food safety agency, such an institute in the United States could greatly improve
scientific coordination and integration. An independent Federal Institute for Food Safety Risk Analysis would
support a risk-based food system through research, data collection, and analysis. It would house the majority of
Recommendations
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scientists and risk analysts currently working on food safety within FDA, FSIS, and CDC and would serve as the
primary point of advice on scientific matters. The FDA and the FSIS should continue to maintain some analytical
staff to conduct rapid turnaround analyses and to serve as “translators” for regulatory risk managers and risk
assessors.
Specific Recommendations
We present six specific recommendations for improving the scientific foundation of the U.S. food safety system,
summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Summary of Recommendations
These recommendations support a more unified model of collecting, managing, and analyzing the information
necessary for a science- and risk-based food safety system. Some of our recommendations are straightforward and
focused, while others are far reaching and will be difficult to implement. We emphasize that the costs of implementing
any of these recommendations may be significant and that how these costs are covered in the long term is a critical
consideration.
Recommendation 1: Produce unified cross-agency annual reports on foodborne pathogen
surveillance in humans, animals, food, and feed.
The CDC, FDA, and USDA should be mandated (and funded) to: produce a unified cross-agency annual
report that presents surveillance data on human foodborne illnesses, including outbreaks and sporadic
cases, and on pathogen contamination in domestic and imported animals, food, and feed; present trends
and provide the evidence basis for measuring food safety progress in a thorough, readable, consumer-
friendly format; undertake routinely updated national estimates of the incidence of foodborne disease
caused by major pathogens.
As described in the findings, the European Union and numerous EU member states produce highly informative and
useful annual reports that combine–in a single place–data on foodborne disease and information on the prevalence
of these same pathogens in animals and food. Thus, one can see trends in illness and contamination, pathogen by
1
Produce unified, cross-agency annual reports on foodborne pathogen surveillance in
humans, animals, food, and feed.
2 Improve farm-to-fork surveillance of domestic and imported food.
3 Increase capacity for integrated food attribution analysis and priority setting.
4 Improve the coordination of food safety research.
5 Improve transparency and public participation.
6 Improve the effectiveness of trace-back and trace-forward data for outbreak response.
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pathogen, over time, presented in tables, graphs, and narrative analysis. These reports include important information
on food safety and foodborne illnesses and are compiled every year and presented in an integrated manner.
Given the critical importance of the information captured in surveillance systems and the ultimate role it must play
in a more evidence-based approach to food safety, and given the success of such reports overseas, we recommend
that CDC, FDA, and USDA be funded and mandated to collaborate on an integrated annual report. Data on
surveillance of human illness and of pathogens in animals and foods are currently spread across dozens of programs
in numerous offices within the three agencies, each of which publishes its own reports, if it publishes at all. No
routine effort is made to combine these data in a single place, to make sense of the data as a whole, or to present
information in a way that would be useful to the educated public. Not only would unified reports greatly increase
government transparency to consumers, they would provide policymakers with some evidence base for measuring
progress on national food safety goals and would be valuable to those in the private sector. The very act of compiling
them likely would result in better cooperation and understanding among those collecting and managing the data.
It is important that these reports be intelligible to educated consumers, not just to food safety experts. These reports
could be an important educational tool that provides a means for those in government and industry, consumers, and
others to have a common understanding of the best available data on foodborne illnesses and the contamination of
foods. Such evidence also could serve as a tool to measure the progress of federal, state, and local food safety efforts.
It is important that the report be organized not by what is most convenient for its creators, but by what makes the
most sense for readers. Most important, data should be organized by pathogen, not program, to allow side-by-side
comparisons of human, animal, and food data. The timeliness of such annual reports also would be critical; the goal
should be publication within nine to 12 months, as longer delays decrease the value of the information. Another goal
should be publication at the same time every year and in roughly the same format to allow cross-year comparisons.
More time consuming than collating and presenting surveillance data is the estimation of the incidence of foodborne
illnesses by pathogen, as presented by Mead et al. (1999) and as currently being revised by CDC.28 Looking at the
European system, 10 years is too long between such estimates; the CDC (or a new, independent federal Institute for
Food Safety Risk Analysis) should be funded to produce estimates of the incidence of foodborne illnesses, by
pathogen on an annual or biannual basis and to present the results in these annual reports. The CDC should develop
a protocol for routinely updating incidence estimates based on a semi-automated methodology that uses rolling data
windows29 and regularly updated model parameters such as underreporting multipliers. Annual incidence estimates
likely would be of great value to national, state, and local policymakers, as well as to consumer advocates and those
in industry.
Recommendation 2: Improve farm-to-table surveillance of domestic and imported food.
A national surveillance plan for food contamination should be developed. As part of this plan, the
agencies should increase data on pathogens in food through routine monitoring, baseline studies, and
food surveys. To support this national surveillance plan, the United States should invest in an integrated
cross-agency surveillance network for animals, food, and feed to connect contamination data, and this
network should support advanced subtyping of isolates.
The Produce Safety Project at Georgetown University • www.producesafetyproject.org
28 At time of publication, new estimates are in peer review.
29 A “rolling window” is a statistical term that means that an estimate for a given year would be based on a shifted time
interval from the same estimate for the previous year. For example, a given estimate for 2009 might be based on data from
2002-2007, while the same estimate for 2010 would be based on data from 2003-2008.
Since 1996, FoodNet, PulseNet, and other human surveillance programs have greatly improved our understanding
of the incidence of foodborne disease. Our ability to properly attribute these illnesses to foods is hampered, however,
by our comparatively meager investment in data on the prevalence and levels or counts of microbial and chemical
contaminants throughout the food chain, including in feed, animals, and food.
Through EU-wide baseline studies and increasingly harmonized surveillance of animals and food products for
pathogens, the European Union is moving toward a coordinated farm-to-table approach. In addition, some EU
countries manage very aggressive monitoring programs, which have been instrumental in managing control
programs, such as Denmark’s efforts on Salmonella in food animals.
To better understand hazards in the food supply, the United States should increase the quantity and utility of data
on pathogens in food. Our specific recommendations include:
• Developing a national surveillance plan. The FDA and USDA should collaborate on developing a national
farm-to-table surveillance plan to unify the numerous, uncoordinated programs now collecting data on the
pathogenic contamination of food, feed, and food animals. As part of this plan, the agencies should identify
data gaps and prioritize new data programs.
• Expanding collection of data on the contamination of foods. Federal agencies should expand routine moni-
toring, baseline studies, and surveys of both FSIS- and FDA-regulated food products, including the testing of
animals and feed and at multiple points between farm and table.
• Creating an integrated cross-agency surveillance network for food, animals, and feed. Significant investment
should be made in a combined electronic network to capture and allow cross-analysis of data on the preva-
lence and levels or counts of microbial and chemical contaminants of domestic and imported food, including
food animals, feed, produce, and processed goods.
Recommendation 3: Increase capacity for integrated food attribution analysis and priority
setting.
A unified strategy should be developed for estimating the relative contribution of various foods to the
overall foodborne disease burden (i.e., food attribution analysis). This effort should include integration
of foodborne pathogen surveillance databases for human, animals, food, and feed, particularly the
integration of subtyping data from nonhuman data into PulseNet. It also should provide for the creation
of a common analysis group to integrate food attribution estimates based on subtyping, outbreak data,
case-control studies, expert elicitation, and other methods. A unified strategy should be developed to
support broad priority setting across and within the agencies dealing with foodborne illnesses. Funding
pathways must be provided, too, to ensure access to data necessary for these analyses.
The FDA and the FSIS have a critical need for attribution analyses to prioritize efforts and to identify potential
opportunities for preventative action. This need, and the need for greater efforts at informing priority setting through
data-driven analysis, highlights the current lack of vehicles for necessary collaboration between the CDC and the
agencies. The regulatory agencies are reliant upon information and analysis by the CDC on the incidence of disease
and the attribution of these diseases to specific food vehicles, but the CDC is not directly answerable to either the
FDA or the FSIS and has few incentives to provide such information within an expedited timeframe.
Furthermore, the CDC’s foodborne group is routinely underfunded and therefore hard pressed to dedicate sufficient
staff time to meet the needs of others. CDC epidemiologists have their own responsibilities, and their investigators
are often too busy responding to outbreaks to conduct the analyses that may be of use to federal regulators. The
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European Union has addressed these issues by creating a centralized analytic capacity and integrated surveillance
and pathogen subtyping databases. It also has established funding pathways to permit analytic groups to “purchase”
needed data or analysis from front-line agencies.
To address the need for data and analysis for food and source attribution, the agencies should create and substantially
fund a cross-agency working group, administratively housed in the Department of Health and Human Services
(given that FDA and CDC are HHS agencies). This analysis group, shown in Figure 9, should include those familiar
with key databases from CDC, FDA, USDA, and other relevant agencies such as the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The group should have access
to all relevant data to conduct attribution analyses and to create collaborative teams to address specific hazards or
research needs.
Figure 9: Cross-agency food attribution analysis group built upon integrated data on foodborne
pathogen surveillance in humans, food, animals, and feed
1 FDA: Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Center for Veterinary Medicine, Office of Regulatory Affairs.
2 USDA: Agricultural Marketing Service, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Agricultural Research Service, Food,
and Nutrition Service, Food Safety and Inspection Service, National Institute for Food and Agriculture.
3 Numerous other agencies include: Environmental Protection Agency, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense.
The cross-agency food attribution analysis group should explore an array of methodological approaches and data
sources, including the use of pathogen subtyping, analysis of aggregated outbreak data, sporadic case-control studies,
comparative exposure assessment modeling, and expert elicitations (see Pires et al. 2009). By building on attribution
studies and estimates of incidence of disease, the group should develop analyses to support priority setting within
the agencies. Such analyses might take the form of risk-ranking models or burden-of-disease estimates connected
to specific products within each agency’s purview (Mangen et al. 2009).
41
BUILDING THE SCIENCE FOUNDATION OF A MODERN FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM
LESSONS FROM DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM ON CREATING A MORE COORDINATED AND
INTEGRATED APPROACH TO FOOD SAFETY INFORMATION
The Produce Safety Project at Georgetown University • www.producesafetyproject.org
A key focus of attribution studies should be the use of pathogen subtyping, and the United States should invest in
improvements to existing subtyping surveillance, namely PulseNet. Europe and the United States increasingly use
microbial fingerprinting methods to link isolates drawn from human cases of foodborne illnesses to one another
and to those drawn from contaminated animals and foods. In the United States, these approaches are used primarily
in outbreak response via PulseNet, while in Europe, subtyping is used more preventively through source attribution
models such as those in Denmark and the Netherlands.
PulseNet has grown dramatically since it was created in the late 1990s, and it has been a critical tool in identifying
the causes of some recent large multistate outbreaks (e.g., E. coli O157:H7 in spinach, Salmonella Saintpaul in
peanut butter). The number of PFGE patterns uploaded annually to PulseNet increased from about 10,000 in 1999
to more than 60,000 in 2007 (Tauxe 2009). These patterns have been largely used to identify outbreaks, but
PulseNet has great potential to inform preventive food safety activities as well, as the data collected can be analyzed
to broadly attribute illnesses to foods, to identify causes and patterns in strains as they relate to clinical outcomes,
and to help identify emerging problems. Our specific recommendations to foster such uses for PulseNet include:
• Integrating PulseNet with similar subtyping databases for animals and foods. PulseNet should be explicitly
integrated with similar databases on animals and foods, such as VetNet, with the goal of eventually developing
a real-time integrated surveillance system for humans, animals, and foods to detect emerging problems. The
FDA, FSIS, and CDC should have joint, unfettered access to the integrated database.
• Increasing adoption of alternative subtyping methods. Ongoing research suggests that subtyping methods
beyond PFGE hold significant promise for detecting outbreaks and attributing illnesses to foods (e.g., Boxrud
2010). Building on prior efforts, PulseNet should aggressively pursue the investigation, standardization, and
adoption of advanced subtyping approaches beyond PFGE. Much of the success of PulseNet is attributable to
its harmonized approaches to laboratory analytics, and the program should continue to pursue such standard-
ization for new methods of bacterial fingerprinting.
• Increasing linkages to outbreak data. PulseNet should be linked with real-time interview data from
OutbreakNet to enable critical investigations of risk factors and source attribution. Such linkages could be
explored through the OutbreakNet Sentinel Sites program.
The United States should further explore the potential for source-attribution studies based on microbial subtyping
data in PulseNet and other networks, considering its increasing use and success worldwide to support pathogen-
control programs. The FSIS and CDC collaborated on one such preliminary study, but did not have sufficient data
for strong conclusions. It is likely that for source attribution to be successful in the United States, additional data
on pathogen contamination will be needed (see Recommendation 4). The FDA and FSIS should identify pathogen-
product pathways for which insufficient information is available to support source attribution by subtype.
As highlighted by the EU example, attributing illnesses to specific foods is a critical link in a risk-based system,
because it is necessary to making informed prioritization decisions. However, better estimates will require greater
collaboration among public health and regulatory agencies and an investment in the necessary studies.
Recommendation 4: Improve the coordination of food safety research.
There is a need for a unified, long-term strategic vision for food safety research, with publication of
annual prioritized lists of specific needs. Research programs should better integrate risk regulators into
the setting of research priorities.
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In consolidated European systems, in which funding for research often flows through regulatory agencies to
independent scientific institutes, we find a more coordinated approach to collecting food safety data than in the
United States. Risk managers play an active role in defining and prioritizing research needs, and, in turn, the research
portfolio within scientific institutes is responsive to policy needs.
Several steps can be taken to improve the coordination of data collection and food safety research in the United
States. Our specific recommendations include:
• Producing prioritized lists of research needs. Agency regulators should take a larger, more active, and more
coordinated role in developing the data to support a risk-based approach. The FDA and FSIS should develop
a shared strategic vision of broad, long-term research and data needs. To do this, they should devise a process
or mechanism by which they can examine a broad set of known data needs in order to identify which ones are
the most critical. This process should include stakeholders and provide an opportunity for public input. The
agencies should create annually updated prioritized lists of data gaps, data needs, and research priorities
within and across program areas.
• Increasing the role of risk regulators in research program priorities. The FSIS and CFSAN should be given a
greater role in defining research priorities in food safety research efforts across FDA and USDA, including
within ARS and NIFA. Likewise, a mechanism should be developed to allow FSIS and CFSAN to provide
independent comment on proposals submitted to competitive grant programs to be considered by review
panels.
• Increasing research budgets. Moving toward a science-based approach to food safety requires an FDA and an
FSIS that pursue new data and new science to address the data needs cited in their strategic plans. Congress
should set aside line-item budgets for the agencies to pursue policy-oriented research and data collection in
support of programs and policies. These expanded budgets should be used by the agencies to fill gaps in
research left by other programs and to address emergencies and other time-critical needs. To build capacity
while maintaining flexibility, these research funds should include both intramural and extramural compo-
nents.
Recommendation 5: Improve transparency and public participation.
Agencies involved in food safety should establish transparency and public-participation policies that
increase publication of data and analyses used to support decisions and that increase stakeholder
engagement and public participation in analytical activities.
The transparency policies of EFSA, the United Kingdom’s FSA, and other EU agencies have led to improved
dissemination of science and analysis developed to support policy. Although the EU experience also shows that
science and public perception are sometimes at odds, thus complicating decision-making for hot-button issues, this
should not be an excuse for secretive decision-making. The goal should be to bridge this gap through education and
more explanation, not less.
The FDA and USDA often disseminate findings from large data-collection programs (such as baseline studies) and
incorporate stakeholders and the public in large pathogen-pathway risk assessments (such as those for E. coli
O157:H7 in ground beef or Listeria monocytogenes in ready-to-eat meats). Less clarity and public engagement are
evident, however, in the analytical process used to support smaller, though still important, decisions.
The FDA and USDA should collaborate to develop similar policies for transparency and public participation in the
development of food safety policy, rulemaking, and risk analysis. These policies could build on the FDA’s Strategic
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Plan for Risk Communication and the efforts of its Transparency Task Force (FDA 2009b, 2010). The recently
announced USDA open government initiative is a step in the right direction.30 To improve transparency, the policy
should promote: the timely disclosure of data sets, information, and analyses used to support changes in policy or
operations; detailed public announcements upon the funding or initiation of research, data collection, and significant
analyses, whether conducted internally or contracted externally; and improved coordination and access to such
information via easy-to-find public Web portals. This policy should inform stakeholders and consumers about
analytical activities and be useful in gathering information to improve these analyses. The policy should attempt to
define some reasonable characteristics for determining when an analysis or decision requires public engagement. The
policy further should explore the use of Web-based tools, such as online presentations and meetings, to engage
stakeholder audiences on analytical activities of significant importance to agency decision-making.
Recommendation 6: Improve the effectiveness of trace-back and trace-forward data for
outbreak response.
Traceability requirements should be extended back to the farm and forward to food service. The FDA and
USDA should develop standard recordkeeping formats to facilitate harmonized data and create incentives
for electronic recordkeeping.
An effective public health response during an outbreak or contamination incident demands that federal regulators
be able to conduct rapid trace-forward and trace-back of suspected products moving through the food chain.
Traceability data are critical pieces of the information puzzle. Lessons from Europe, independent studies of U.S. food
traceability (e.g., IFT 2010, HHS 2009), and recent U.S. outbreaks make it clear that current U.S. requirements
for tracing food products are insufficient.
To improve the capacity of federal agencies to access timely and accurate traceability information to support
investigations and recalls, our recommendations include:
• Expanding traceability requirements along the farm-to-fork chain. Legislators should provide FDA with the
statutory authority to require all firms in the food system, including farmers, food service establishments, and
brokers, to maintain one-up, one-down, lot-specific records of food transactions with other businesses and to
maintain internal traceability of lots within firms (e.g., between warehouses and retail operations).
• Enforcing existing requirements through enforceable audits. The FDA and USDA should be given the statu-
tory authority to request records outside of emergency or outbreak situations in order to conduct enforcement
audits of recordkeeping compliance.
• Standardizing recordkeeping formats. Federal agencies should standardize and specify key data elements and
formats to be captured for any food transaction. The government shouldn’t mandate particular technologies,
but produce standards that ensure compatibility and inter-operability.
• Creating incentives or requirements for electronic recordkeeping. The FDA and USDA should create incen-
tives, or requirements, for companies to maintain electronic records. Paper records can be difficult to obtain
and manually stringing together information from them can be both challenging and time and resource inten-
sive. These issues create delays in trace-back and trace-forward investigations.
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The past decade has been one of significant change in Europe, both at the national and EU levels. Since the late
1990s, European countries that have undertaken major reforms and consolidated their food safety agencies (GAO
2005) include Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. At
the same time, the European Union has centralized and harmonized its food safety efforts (Leibovitch 2008).
Overview of European Reform
To draw specific lessons from European food safety it is necessary to first understand the motivating forces that led
to reform. Some efforts to improve and harmonize food safety at the EU level were attempted in the 1980s, but the
steps were limited out of respect for socially important culinary cultures and to maintain free trade (Alemanno
2006, Leibovitch 2008).
Mad cow disease changed that. The BSE crisis collapsed the public trust in the United Kingdom and throughout
Europe (Shears et al. 2001; Knowles et al. 2007). In addition to BSE, Europe also faced other food scares in the
1990s, most of which did not materialize in the United States. In particular, it saw rising rates and persistent
outbreaks of Salmonella Enteritidis throughout its borders (Rabsch et al. 2001). In 1995 and 1996, Sweden had a
nationwide outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 for which no source was identified. (Ziese et al. 1996). In 1996, Scotland,
too, had a major outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 caused by cooked meat pies, which sickened 500 and led to 20 deaths
(Pennington 2003). In Belgium in 1999, feed for chicken and other animals was found to be contaminated with
dioxins, which led to major culls and recalls (Larebeke et al. 2001). Also in 1999 in Belgium, Coca-Cola was
suspected of causing a large outbreak of illnesses among schoolchildren, although nothing was ever confirmed, and
many speculate that the children’s illnesses were sociogenic (Nemery et al. 2002). That same year, France had two
large, nationwide outbreaks of Listeria monocytogenes (Valk et al. 2001).
In addition to concerns about microbiological hazards in foods, the 1980s and 1990s brought a rise in public
sentiment opposed to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and the use of growth hormones in cattle, such as
recombinant bovine somatrotropin (rBST). The outcry about these issues played an important role in public support
for the overhaul of the European Union’s food safety policies, although it has also led to continued conflicts between
scientific risk assessments and public sentiment in areas outside of microbiological safety.
As a result of these incidents and changes in public sentiment, European food safety institutions undertook reforms
(Buonanno 2006), summarized in Table 4.
Appendix A. The European Food Safety System
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Table 4: Timeline of recent events in EU food safety
1994 Denmark establishes its Danish Zoonosis Centre (DZC).
1996
The United Kingdom announces a link between vCJD and BSE, leading to an EU ban on
British beef.
1997
IThe EU Parliament passes censure of the European Commission’s handling of the BSE
crises.
The European Commission publishes a communication on consumer health and food
safety and a green paper on the general principles of food law.
Denmark creates a consolidated food safety agency (DVFA).
1998 The EU initiates a moratorium on GMOs.
1999 A dioxin scare in Belgium, a Coca-Cola scare in Belgium, Listeria outbreaks in France.
France creates the French Food Safety Agency (AFFSA).
Ireland establishes the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI).
The EU Council of Ministers agrees to a permanent ban of rBST.
2000
The European Commission publishes a white paper on food safety, which proposes a new
European agency for food safety.
The United Kingdom creates the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
2002 The EU adopts the General Food Law.
Germany creates the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) and the Federal Office
of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL).
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain create consolidated food safety agencies: the
Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES), the Federal Agency for Safety of the
Food Chain (FASFC), the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA), and the
Spanish Agency for Food Security and Nutrition (AESAN).
2003 The EFSA is established in Parma, Italy.
2004 The EU passes hygiene regulations.
2005 The ECDC is established.
2006 Finland creates the Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira).
2007 Denmark moves risk assessment into independent, university-based institutes.
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In 1997, the president of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, came out in favor of an independent food
safety agency (Alemanno 2008). In a speech to the European Parliament, he suggested basing this agency on the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Santer 1997):
I also think that an independent agency, to meet the specific needs of the community but based on the
positive aspects of the United States Food and Drug Administration, should be considered. Compliance
with the principle of subsidiarity, to which we are all attached, must not be used as a pretext for
obstructing the emergence of a credible European health protection system, as a necessary follow-on
from the single market.
That same year, the European Commission published two papers that outlined the principles and objectives of a new
approach to food safety that shifted from a basic principle of enabling food trade to one of protecting the public
health (EC 1997a, 1997b, Vos 2000). In 1999, a report commissioned by the EC recommended the creation of the
European Food and Public Health Authority (EFPHA), an independent and integrated agency that would have
included risk management (e.g., regulatory authority), risk assessment, and disease response and surveillance (James
et al. 1999). The authority essentially would have had the combined responsibilities of FDA, FSIS, and CDC,
although with additional independence. This would have stripped the European Commission and the European
Parliament, and therefore the EU member states, of legislative and executive power, so the idea of an independent
regulatory authority was scrapped (Alemanno 2008).
In 2000, the EC published a white paper on food safety, which announced: “A radical new approach is proposed”
(EC 2000a, p.3). The commission called for an independent European food safety authority and outlined eight
principles to guide European food safety policy (p.8):
1.Food safety policy must be based on a “comprehensive, integrated approach” from farm to table.
2.Primary responsibility is with food operators, though all stakeholders, such as government and consumers,
play important roles and have responsibilities.
3.Food safety relies upon “traceability of feed and food and their ingredients.”
4.“The comprehensive, integrated approach will lead to a more coherent, effective, and dynamic food policy”
with increased transparency and accountability.
5.Food safety policy should be based upon risk analysis.
6.Food safety policy should be based upon the best available science, and scientific advice should be inde-
pendent.
7.Where possible, the “precautionary principle” should be applied.
8.In decision-making, other factors relevant to public health or fairness in trade may be considered, such as
environmental concerns, animal welfare, and sustainability.
These principles became the core of Regulation EC No. 178/2002, adopted by the Council of the EU and the
European Parliament and known colloquially as the General Food Law of 2002.31 The law mandated a
comprehensive farm-to-table approach, reliance upon risk analysis, scientific independence, traceability programs,
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and transparency. It created the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), which is used to quickly notify
other countries when any action is taken on a food risk, such as a recall, in an exported product.
Perhaps most important, the law created the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA),32 an independent agency that
provides scientific advice to relevant bodies in the European Commission, such as those in the Directorate General
for Public Health and Consumer Protection (known as DG-SANCO). The EFSA does not create or enforce
regulations; rather, it performs risk assessments for the EC to test various standards and regulatory options,
recommends standards, determines specifics of EU data programs, and performs analyses upon request for the
commission and member countries. In addition, it collects obligatory food and feed surveillance data from member
states for its annual surveillance report.
Some people have questioned the independence of EFSA because the EC evaluates its work for “coherence.” This
suggests that the EC can stall or steer EFSA’s work if it doesn’t like its advice. Other people see an additional conflict
built into the founding principles of the General Food Law. While principles 5 and 6 of the law call for the use of
risk analysis and the best available science, principles 7 and 8 argue for taking precautions and the consideration
of other factors. The commission published detailed guidance on when and how to apply the precautionary principle
in relation to risk assessment (EC 2000b), but in practical terms, the principle provides cover for the dismissal of
scientific analysis: When objective analyses reach conclusions that are politically unpopular, decision-makers can
side with popular sentiment in the name of “precaution.” While this conflict has been apparent on hot-button issues
such as GMOs and hormones, policy for microbiological safety, the principal concern of this report, has been far more
driven by scientific analysis.
The EFSA was originally responsible for collecting human data on sporadic and outbreak cases in addition to data
on food and feed, but this is now the responsibility of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC), which was created in 2005.33 The ECDC’s mission is to “identify, assess and communicate current and
emerging threats to human health posed by infectious diseases” (Regulation (EC) No. 851/2004).34 The ECDC
coordinates multinational outbreak response within the European Union and manages surveillance programs for
zoonotic and foodborne pathogens. The EFSA and ECDC collaborate on an annual community report on the
surveillance of zoonoses, based upon data submitted by EU member states. According to our interviews, the creation
of ECDC has improved human disease surveillance but has come at the cost of less-accessible data; EFSA working
groups now have more difficulty obtaining human data than they did before the advent of ECDC.
Subsequent legislation has continued to reform the EU food safety system and to spell out initiatives (such as
traceability) mandated by the 2002 law.
The EFSA and Member States
The EFSA, based in Parma, Italy, is a relatively small organization given the scope of its mandate, and concerns
about its underfunding have been prevalent in the media and trade press (e.g., Phillips 2008, ElAmin 2007, Fletcher
2006). Its budget and staff have doubled in the past five years, however. In 2005, EFSA had a budget of €36
million, less than the €44 million originally promised, and a staff of 160, but the preliminary 2010 budget amounts
to €74.4 million and the staff at the end of 2008 was 395 (EFSA 2006a, EFSA 2009a, EFSA 2009b).




The EFSA is a diffuse organization, with a relatively small staff based in Parma, Italy, and numerous panels,
committees, and networks of experts and representatives from throughout Europe, as shown in Figure 10. It is led
by a management board and an executive director. The 14 members of the board represent a rotating geographical
subset of EU member states, and the board must include at least four members with backgrounds in consumer
advocacy. The executive director oversees day-to-day operations and sets priorities for the workload. An advisory
forum links EFSA and the member states, and it is composed of representatives of the states’ national food agencies.
The forum meets four times a year and advises the EFSA executive director on all aspects of the organization,
including its work plan. A scientific committee and scientific panels form the core of EFSA. The scientific committee
is composed of the chairs of the panels plus a handful of independent experts, and it is responsible for coordinating
the work of the panels and maintaining consistency in scientific opinions. Ten EFSA panels are dedicated to a range
of issues. Each panel has a maximum of 21 independent scientific experts who are not EFSA employees. Panelists
are selected by the board on the proposal of the executive director and chosen through open competition among
experts principally drawn from member states (though they do not act as representatives of their countries). The
forum, the scientific committee, and the scientific panels are supported by the Scientific Cooperation and Assistance
Directorate, created in 2008 and comprised of units with expertise in areas critical to the development of scientific
opinions, such as risk-assessment methodology, data collection and exposure, and zoonoses surveillance.
Figure 10: Simplified diagram of primary EU-level food safety institutions and bodies
Source: created by authors based on EFSA (2010c)
The EFSA interacts with EU member state institutions and individual experts in several ways, as shown in Figure
10. In addition to direct participation in scientific panels, the scientific committee, and the advisory forum, experts
may be consulted by ad hoc working groups and task forces created for specific issues and may participate in EFSA
49
BUILDING THE SCIENCE FOUNDATION OF A MODERN FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM
LESSONS FROM DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM ON CREATING A MORE COORDINATED AND
INTEGRATED APPROACH TO FOOD SAFETY INFORMATION
The Produce Safety Project at Georgetown University • www.producesafetyproject.org
BUILDING THE SCIENCE FOUNDATION OF A MODERN FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM
LESSONS FROM DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM ON CREATING A MORE COORDINATED AND
INTEGRATED APPROACH TO FOOD SAFETY INFORMATION 50
networks designed to link expertise across the EU. The EC directly appoints community reference laboratories,
which work with EFSA to improve technical capacity and harmonize methods throughout the system. Other
“competent” organizations within the member states, such as scientific institutes, further engage with EFSA on
specific projects.
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In this appendix, we describe the national food safety systems of Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom. We present an overview of their institutions and their responsibilities, as well as their relevant recent
history of institutional reform.
Denmark
The institutions that make up Denmark’s food safety system have changed considerably during the past 15 years.
In 1994, following large Salmonella outbreaks, Denmark established the Danish Zoonosis Centre (DZC) at the
Danish Veterinary Institute (DVI) to systematically collect, collate, and analyze food safety data from throughout
the food chain. The DZC was the first integrated surveillance institute of its kind in the world and has served as a
model for other countries.
In 1997, Denmark also became one of the first countries to consolidate its food safety system, by creating the Danish
Veterinary and Food Administration (DVFA) within its newly formed Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries
(MFLF). The major reorganization was intended to improve efficiency and effectiveness and communications with
consumers (GAO 2005). In 2004, DVFA was moved to the Ministry of Family and Consumer Affairs, but was moved
back to the MFLF in 2007 under another reorganization plan.
Today, the primary institutes and agencies responsible for food safety in Denmark are located within three ministries:
the MFLF, the Ministry of the Interior and Health (SUM), and the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation
(VTU), as shown in Figure 11.
The DVFA is the lead food safety agency, responsible for managing foodborne risks based upon risk assessments and
advice provided by independent scientific institutes. It develops and administers rules, regulations, and plans to
control chemicals and pathogens in the food supply. DVFA inspectors based within 10 regional veterinary and food
control authorities (RVFCA) are responsible for the inspection of animals, food, retail, and service establishments.
The regional authorities further provide information to consumers, food companies, and veterinarians. The DVFA
is also responsible for nutrition, including labeling, trade (import/export) issues, animal health, and, to a lesser
extent, animal welfare. In 2006, Denmark created the Danish Alert Unit for Food (DAUF) within the DVFA to serve
as a coordinating and communications body during food crises such as outbreaks.
SUM includes general practitioners, hospitals, a national board of health, and 15 regional medical officers of health.
Perhaps more directly important for food safety, it also includes the Statens Serum Institut (SSI),35 which is dedicated
to monitoring and preventing infectious and congenital disease and is similar in many respects to the U.S. CDC. The
SSI and SUM run the nation’s clinical microbiology laboratories.
Denmark’s scientific institutes are housed within VTU. Denmark undertook two reforms to fully separate food safety
risk assessment from risk management. In 2004, risk assessment activities were removed from DVFA and DVI to
form the Danish Institute for Food and Veterinary Research (DFVF). Then, in 2007, DFVF was moved from the
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries to the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation and merged
with the Technical University of Denmark (DTU). The DFVF was split into two university institutes: the National
Food Institute (DTU Food) and the National Veterinary Institute (DTU Vet).
Appendix B. Food Safety In Three European Countries
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Figure 11: Simplified diagram of food safety authorities in Denmark
Note: Solid arrows indicate flow of authority and/or funding, while dotted arrows indicate primary information flows; source:
adapted from DTU Food (2009b).
DTU Food’s role as an independent institute is essentially to collect and synthesize information from throughout the
system on a broad set of issues associated with food, analyze these data, and disseminate the results.36 For foodborne
pathogens, DTU Food has responsibilities in integrated pathogen and disease surveillance, epidemiological research,
risk assessment, and diagnostic and analytical laboratory services. It is the national reference laboratory for a number
of foodborne pathogens and serves as the EU reference laboratory for antimicrobial resistance.
Within DTU Food, DZC plays a coordinating role in zoonoses and foodborne pathogens by serving as a hub for
DVFA, SSI, clinical and veterinary laboratories, environmental and public health authorities, and others.37 The
DZC is also the EFSA’s Zoonosis Collaborating Centre, which means it collects, collates, and produces annual EU
reports on surveillance of zoonoses in animals and food.
The Danish Environmental Protection Agency and the Danish Plant Directorate have responsibilities associated
with food safety, and university research centers work with the government, including the Faculty of Agricultural
Sciences and the National Environmental Research Institute, both at Aarhus University and at the Faculty of Life
Sciences at the University of Copenhagen.
Denmark is recognized as a world leader in disease surveillance. Physicians report cases of certain diseases to the
Department of Epidemiology within the Statens Serum Institut, while positive cases from all clinical laboratories are
reported for these pathogens within one week to the Unit of Gastrointestinal Infections also within the SSI; there,
they are entered into the Registry of Enteric Pathogens (REP). Salmonella and VTEC isolates are serotyped and
genotyped by SSI laboratories and phage typed by DTU Food. In 2005, DTU Food, the SSI, and DVFA created a
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joint online database that combined prior networks for foodborne and waterborne outbreaks; it is available to all
Danish officials involved in foodborne outbreaks regardless of their agency. The SSI has also created the
Gastroenteritis Monitor (http://www.germ.dk), a public Web site that is updated weekly with Danish laboratory
surveillance data on foodborne illnesses and which can be viewed in tables, as graphs, and in maps. A screen-capture
of the GERM Web site is shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Screen capture of Denmark’s Gastroenteritis Monitor
Source: http://www.germ.dk.
The Netherlands
The Netherlands consolidated its food safety agencies in 2002 for three primary reasons: to improve efficiency, to
comply with new EU legislation, and to respond to the public outcry following food safety scares, including BSE and
dioxin in animal feed (GAO 2005). The Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) consolidated
enforcement by combining routine inspections from the health ministry with traditional meat inspection from the
agricultural ministry. Additional modernization efforts aimed to move from “end-product testing” to “farm-to-
consumption process controls” and to embrace more open and transparent risk analysis. The major institutions of
Dutch food safety are shown in Figure 13.
The VWA is an independent agency based within the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality (LNV),
although it gets more than half of its funding from the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sport (VWS). The VWA is
not responsible for setting regulatory targets or policies, as these responsibilities are handled by the ministries of
agriculture (farm and feed) and health (post-slaughter).
Although its primary responsibility is enforcement — to use inspection and other tools to ensure compliance —
VWA is also responsible for risk assessment and risk communication, and it includes an independent Office of Risk
Assessment (ORA). About half of the risk assessments conducted or commissioned by ORA are self-initiated, while
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the rest are required to support law enforcement or specific needs of the ministries. The ORA maintains some
capacity to perform risk assessments in-house, but it generally relies upon the National Institute for Public Health
and the Environment (RIVM) for more substantial analyses.
Figure 13: Simplified diagram of food safety authorities in the Netherlands
Note: Solid arrows indicate flow of authority and/or funding, while dotted arrows indicate primary information flows; source:
based on information from BfR (2009) and RIVM.
The RIVM is a large, independent scientific research and advisory institute with more than 1,500 employees who
work in public health, infectious disease, nutrition, and environmental protection.38 It is based within the health
ministry, although much of its funding comes through VWA, which is based in the agricultural ministry. From an
information and analytical standpoint, RIVM is the central food safety research and surveillance body in the
Netherlands. It has two primary roles. The first is as a critical piece in the response and surveillance system; RIVM
manages surveillance of foodborne disease, performs epidemiological research, and serves as a national and
international reference laboratory for Salmonella and residues on food. Its second role is in applied research and risk
assessment; RIVM conducts formal risk assessments for VWA and the health ministry, as well as additional risk
research.
The RIKILT Institute for Food Safety (RIKILT), affiliated with Wageningen University, is an independent research
institute that focuses on pesticide and veterinary residues, feed safety, and analysis of GMOs.39 Like RIVM, RIKILT
is a “house” agency of VWA and provides scientific advice to VWA and the ministries. The RIKILT and RIVM have
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recently reorganized and consolidated staffs; RIVM is now responsible for microbiological hazards in food and feed,
while RIKILT is responsible for chemical hazards.
Other Dutch agencies and research organizations participate in public-sector food safety, such as the Plant Protection
Service (PD), the Landbouw-Economisch Instituut (LEI), and the Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) at
Vrije University.
The Netherlands has surveillance programs for zoonoses and foodborne pathogens (Valkenburgh et al. 2007). It
monitors some foodborne pathogens on a sentinel basis through the participation of a subset of regional public
health laboratories (PHLs). For example, 16 of these laboratories, representing 64 percent of the Dutch population,
report Salmonella (Enter-Net 2007), while 50 percent of the Dutch population is covered for Campylobacter. E. coli
O157:H7 and other VTEC and Listeria monocytogenes are reported by all laboratories, with additional data from
subsequent epidemiological interviews.
The Netherlands has conducted additional epidemiological studies, including nationwide estimates of the burden of
gastroenteritis based on cohort studies (Wit et al. 2001a), large case-control studies on Campylobacter and
Salmonella (Doorduyn et al. 2006a, Nauta et al. 2005), and general-practitioner reporting studies (Wit et al. 2001b,
Brandhof 2006).
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom was one of the first European countries to undergo major food safety reform. The scandal
surrounding the government’s response to the BSE crisis of the late 1990s resulted in an unprecedented loss of
public confidence in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF). As one scholar noted, “Indeed, rarely
had a national government ministry in the developed world achieved such global infamy” (Rothstein 2006, p.154).
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) was created in 2000 as a nonministerial government department, independent
of the agricultural ministry, in response to the widespread public belief that prior decisions on food safety were
made in the best interest of industry rather than of consumers (GAO 2005).40 The FSA also addressed two other
major problems of the old regime: institutional fragmentation and opaqueness of decision-making. The FSA set out
three guiding principles in line with these issues: “putting consumers first,” “openness,” and “independence.”
The FSA is notable as one of the few food safety agencies that has true autonomy. The FSA doesn’t report to any
minister, but instead to a board composed of 13 members who are appointed by the health secretary. Board meetings
are held monthly and are open to the public; presentations and reports are available on FSA’s Web site. As previously
discussed, DVFA in Denmark and VWA in the Netherlands both report to the agriculture minister, as do the
consolidated food safety agencies in Germany, France, Ireland, Canada, and New Zealand (GAO 2005, 2008).
The United Kingdom recently further consolidated food safety functions within FSA by dissolving the Meat Hygiene
Service (MHS) and incorporating its staff and responsibilities for inspecting animals, carcasses, and offals during
production, in slaughter, and in processing (for meat safety and animal health and welfare) throughout England,
Scotland, and Wales.41 Until April 1, 2010, MHS was an executive agency of FSA, which meant its budgeting and
administration were separate from other FSA operations. Meat inspection will continue to be the largest component
of FSA in terms of staff and budget.
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The FSA’s primary responsibilities are standard setting, inspection, risk analysis, education, and public outreach. It
also sets inspection policy for nonmeat foods such as fruit, vegetables, feed, and processed goods. Local inspection
authorities perform these inspections, but they are overseen by FSA, which sets codes of practice and conducts
audits. The FSA employs analysts (including economists, statisticians, operational researchers, and social science
researchers) in a central team (analysis and research division) to provide analytical support for its activities. The
work has included using risk analysis and other approaches to help with priority setting and resource allocation and
to identify potential policy interventions.
The FSA doesn’t maintain its own laboratory capacity, but it works closely with the Health Protection Agency (HPA)
and the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (Defra) for such services, as shown in Figure 14. The
HPA was created in 2003 as a semi-autonomous “special health authority” of the National Health Service, but
became an independent nondepartmental agency in 2005. 42 Like FSA, it is an “arm’s length” body, although it is
funded through the Department of Health and answers to the secretary of state of health and to the United Kingdom’s
chief medical officer. The HPA is the United Kingdom’s primary public health body, chiefly concerned with protection
against infectious disease, chemical exposure, and radiological hazards. Three divisions of HPA work on food safety.
The Centre for Infections has a similar role in food safety to that of the CDC in the United States: Both are responsible
for the surveillance of human disease, outbreak investigations, and some epidemiological research. The Local and
Regional Services (LaRS) division of HPA is responsible for the investigation and control of outbreaks at the local
level. The HPA’s Regional Microbiology Network (RMN) is composed of specialist laboratories that conduct
diagnostic work on clinical isolates referred from physicians and on food samples taken during outbreak
investigations, food surveys, and research projects.
Unlike the CDC, however, HPA conducts microbiological food surveys in retail products and risk assessments. Some
food surveys are done under contract for FSA, while others are conducted on its own initiative. These studies are
usually conducted by working with local authorities who collect the samples and submit them to control laboratories.
The HPA has conducted risk assessments for Salmonella in pooled egg mixtures or shell eggs and Listeria
monocytogenes in specialty meats.
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Figure 14: Simplified diagram of food safety authorities in the United Kingdom
Note: Solid arrows indicate flow of authority and/or funding, while dotted arrows indicate primary information flows; source:
based on information from BfR (2009), FSA, and HPA.
The Defra is the United Kingdom’s department that is responsible for environmental protection, agriculture, fisheries,
and rural communities.43 Food production is one of its major focuses, including research and surveillance of some
human hazards, such as abbatoir and food-animal studies on microbial and chemical hazards. The Defra has food
safety responsibilities, such as feed safety, animal health, animal and animal product imports, beef labeling, organic
standards, and residues of chemicals and veterinary drugs. It conducts both chemical and microbiological risk
assessments, and its numerous agencies perform food safety work under contract to FSA or under their own initiative,
including the Food and Environment Research Agency (FERA, known prior to April 2009 as the Central Science
Laboratory), the Centre for Environment, Fisheries, and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS), the Marine and Fisheries
Agency (MFA), and the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA).
In the United Kingdom, clinical laboratories voluntarily report data on confirmed cases to HPA, which maintains
surveillance on more than 4,000 pathogens. The HPA also manages nationwide outbreak surveillance, which it
learns about through national laboratory reporting and from consultants in communicable disease control,
environmental health officers, microbiologists, and HPA reference laboratories.
Other institutions also work with FSA and EFSA. The EU Food Safety Almanac lists 36 that are involved in EFSA
networks, including some of the agencies just discussed as well as the Institute of Food Research (IFR), a nonprofit
research organization, colleges and university-based research centers, public laboratories, and some private
laboratory services (BfR, 2009).
The United Kingdom published a major report in 2000 on the incidence of intestinal infectious disease (IID) in
England (Tam et al 2003, FSA 2000). It was a complex and comprehensive community-based study conducted by
a large collaborative group that included academic researchers, national health bodies, and local health authorities.
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It involved nearly 10,000 patients selected randomly from 70 general practitioners’ offices. Through surveys, follow-
up questionnaires, and studies of physician and laboratory behavior, the study was able to quantify underreporting
at each stage of the reporting pyramid (e.g., likelihoods that an ill person goes to the doctor, that the doctor takes
a stool sample, that the organism is identified, that the finding is reported). It found that 20 percent of the population
of England suffered from foodborne illnesses annually, an incidence approximately 100 times higher than reported
by surveillance systems alone. A second IID study (IID2) is underway under commission by the FSA; this study will
expand the community to the entirety of the United Kingdom and involves improvements to study design.44
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The Produce Safety Project commissioned the writing of this report and is responsible for its content. PSP
would like to acknowledge and thank for his review of this report: Dr. Morris Potter, formerly of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention. The views in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the reviewer
or of The Pew Charitable Trusts.
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